

**Amendment A by Board Member Daniel J. Santos to
YELLOW FOLDER Doc#2017-300-061, Systematic Safety Oversight**

DRAFT – FOR DELIBERATION AT PUBLIC BUSINESS MEETING

This Request for Board Action (RFBA) directs the Technical Director to not proceed to final design and implementation of the proposed scorecard process and cease all related activities (e.g., pilot programs). Also, this RFBA replaces the previous Board direction contained in the October 11, 2016, RFBA 2017-300-004.

In addition, as part of the development of the FY2018 technical work plan, the Technical Director is directed to leverage lessons learned from the development to date of the proposed scorecard process to identify and institutionalize improvements to the independent technical oversight work of the Office of the Technical Director. This effort should satisfy the following goals: 1) improve the information sharing, evaluation of cross-cutting safety issues, and standardization (to the extent possible) of risk-ranking for safety issues across all technical groups; 2) improve the technical work planning, measurement, and execution process; 3) improve the timing and quality of information provided to the Board for the Board to be able to more efficiently and effectively establish safety oversight priorities and understand resource allocations and needs for the Office of the Technical Director; and 4) maximize the use of technical information generated by the DNFSB staff independent evaluations.

Finally, the Technical Director is directed to brief the Board on the specific actions taken on this RFBA, including but not limited to those actions incorporated into the proposed FY2018 technical work plan, by September 30, 2017.

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This Request for Board Action (RFBA) directs the Technical Director to not proceed to final design and implementation of the proposed scorecard process and cease all related activities (e.g., pilot programs) complete final design and implementation of the Systematic Safety Oversight (SSO) process. Also, ~~t~~This RFBA replaces the previous Board direction contained in the October 11, 2016, RFBA 2017-300-004.

In addition, as part of the development of the FY2018 technical work plan, the Technical Director is directed to leverage lessons learned from the development to date of the proposed scorecard process to identify and institutionalize improvements to the independent technical oversight work of the Office of the Technical Director. This effort should satisfy the following goals: 1) improve the information sharing, evaluation of cross-cutting safety issues, and standardization (to the extent possible) of risk-ranking for safety issues across all technical groups; 2) improve the technical work planning, measurement, and execution process; 3) improve the timing and quality of information provided to the Board for the Board to be able to more efficiently and effectively establish safety oversight priorities and understand resource allocations and needs for the Office of the Technical Director; and 4) maximize the use of technical information generated by the DNFSB staff independent evaluations.

Finally, the Technical Director is directed to brief the Board on the specific actions taken on this RFBA, including but not limited to those actions incorporated into the proposed FY2018 technical work plan, by September 30, 2017.

~~The SSO goal is to conduct objective, risk informed, understandable, and predictable evaluations of defined safety areas at defense nuclear facilities that provide input to the Board's safety oversight priorities and processes to support the overall mission of the Agency.~~

~~The SSO methodology is meant to augment staff oversight and to provide input into the work planning process. The Technical Director will design the SSO process for internal communication.~~

~~The SSO scope includes facility safety—accident prevention and mitigation, including the following three safety cornerstones: safety basis, safety systems and controls, and emergency preparedness and response.~~

~~The SSO scope will begin with operating Hazard Category 2 defense nuclear facilities, with the exception of onsite transportation and some underground material storage areas (i.e., material disposal areas at Los Alamos National Laboratory). The exclusion of some defense nuclear facilities from the SSO process will not preclude or limit future Board oversight activities at any defense nuclear facility as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.~~

~~The technical staff will complete an Instruction defining the SSO process and~~

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~~methodology. This Instruction will be in lieu of a Directive that was previously discussed in the RFBA dated October 11, 2016. The technical staff will provide the Instruction to the Board members no later than July 31, 2017.~~

~~The technical staff will brief the Board biannually on the results, effectiveness of the process, and any adjustments that were made or envisioned. The first brief will occur in September 2017.~~

~~The technical staff will brief the Board weekly on progress and issues associated with SSO design and implementation, until initial implementation in September 2017.~~

~~The SSO process should facilitate cross-cutting evaluations of nuclear safety areas within the scope described above. The technical staff management team should work closely with the SSO team to define techniques that identify cross-cutting issues and to prioritize oversight work accordingly.~~