

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 26, 2016

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: P. Fox and D. Gutowski Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending August 26, 2016

Board Deputy Technical Director R. Tontodonato was on site evaluating site rep performance. Board staff members D. Cleaves and R. Quirk were on site observing the Plutonium Finishing Plant readiness assessment.

Plutonium Finishing Plant. The contractor completed actions necessary to establish that criticality is incredible in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), declared readiness to start demolition of the facility, and started the contractor Readiness Assessment. The readiness declaration included a list of open prestart items that included completion of PRF cold and dark isolations, removal of gloveboxes from the upper three levels of the PRF, final application of fixative in the canyon, removal of remaining hazardous material and application of fixative to the remainder of the facility, and PRF entry into the demolition phase.

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility. Approximately 20 gallons of contaminated grout material was spilled while filling the inactivated K3 ventilation system filter pit. The area has been isolated and the contractor is developing a recovery plan.

Tank Farms. The site rep and Deputy Technical Director walked down a number of areas where material is stored and staged to support tank farms operations and projects. This included the Mission Support Contractor's warehouse which stores emergency primary and annulus pumps, its associated laydown area, two materials storage facilities owned by the Tank Farms Contractor, and the Tank Farms projects marshalling yard. Contractor quality assurance personnel identified a number of preliminary deficiencies in the marshalling yard.

The contractor completed in-service leak testing of the new extended reach sluicers in AY-102.

222-S Laboratory. The site rep observed an evaluated Incident Command Post Limited Drill at the Lab simulated as occurring on the offshift. The scenario was a helicopter crash that breached the 11A Hot Cell Annex.

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility. A worker that had become frustrated when his powered air purifying respirator hood obstructed his view removed the hood while in an airborne radioactivity area (ARA). The worker immediately re-donned the hood, but continued work instead of leaving the ARA. Another worker and a Radiological Control Technician who were aware of the event did not act to ensure that the operator left the ARA and also did not notify their supervisors. Standard surveys at work completion found no contamination. Subsequent review of lapel dosimetry after the event was reported the following day determined that there was no exposure above levels that would allow work without respiratory protection. The contractor held an event investigation and is implementing corrective actions.

Waste Treatment Plant. The contractor held a 60% System Design Review for the Effluent Management Facility focused on the evaporator.