

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 29, 2016

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** P. Fox and D. Gutowski Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending July 29, 2016

M. Forsbacka was on site to observe the DOE Criticality Safety Support Group's review of Waste Treatment Plant criticality safety documentation. DNFSB staff members met with RL and contractor representatives to discuss the conclusions from a review of the K3 Ventilation Upgrade and Hot-Cell Grouting Final Design for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility.

**Tank Farms.** The contractor performed the annual TSR surveillance for flow in the AP farm ventilation train A. The AP-A train surveillance initially showed that not all tanks had the required minimum flow. The contractor entered the appropriate LCO and was subsequently able to bring all flows to an acceptable level. A similar AP-B train surveillance was paused after they again did not meet the minimum flow in all tanks. The proposed path forward is to run AP-A train while staying in the LCO for AP-B and wait for the tie-in of the new AP exhausters in a few weeks. The new exhausters should provide substantially more flow than the existing system.

A team from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was onsite to evaluate the Tank Farms vapors program.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP).** A worker was found to have skin contamination and a high lapel sampler reading after completing concrete characterization activities in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon. The most likely cause of the skin contamination was cross contamination that occurred during removal of personal protective equipment. It was noted that the individual's inner set of anti-contamination was soaked through with sweat reducing its effectiveness. The high lapel sampler reading was most likely the result of working in an area of high contamination with unfavorable air flow. The individual was successfully decontaminated and a chest count indicated negative results. The individual will also submit a bioassay sample. This is the first skin contamination event since December of last year.

**Z-9 Crib.** RL approved the DSA and TSRs for the Z-9 Waste Storage Crib Facility. This is an inactive, below grade Hazard Category-2 facility near PFP. It was formerly included in the safety basis for PFP. As it is not included in the PFP D&D safety basis, the contractor prepared a new standalone safety basis.

**222-S Laboratory.** The contractor discovered another crack in the post-filter ducting of the Lab's ventilation system (see Activity Report 7/22/2016). This discovery occurred during an initial extent of condition look at the system. A more thorough assessment is being planned.

The contractor Joint Review Committee approved a work package to remove a shredder from the Lab. This equipment was used to shred vials containing tank waste and is highly contaminated.

**RL Management.** Stacy Charboneau has assumed a new role as the Associate Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Field Operations at DOE headquarters in Washington, DC. Douglas Shoop is the new RL Manager.