

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 10, 2016

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** S.A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R.K. Verhaagen and J.W. Plaue  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Report for Week Ending June 10, 2016

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** R. C. Eul observed the training on causal analysis and corrective action development discussed below. On Thursday, B. K. Caleca, M. W. Dunlevy, and T. J. Dwyer conducted a teleconference with personnel from the NNSA Field Office and LANL to follow-up on actions from last month's working group meeting on additional seismic analysis for the Plutonium Facility.

**Federal Oversight:** A team of experienced personnel from across the DOE complex conducted an Organizational Health Assessment of the NNSA Field Office. The team's objective, executed primarily through interviews, was to identify challenges to enhancing organizational effectiveness for a nuclear safety environment, including follow-up on a number of recent employee concerns raised regarding the manner used for resolution of divergent views on issues.

**Continuous Improvement:** On Tuesday and Wednesday afternoon, Quality and Performance Assurance (QPA) personnel conducted training on techniques for causal analysis and corrective action development. The training supports a key initiative under LANL's Performance Assurance Improvement Plan and was the second instance of a substantially reinvigorated version of the course that until recently had been dormant for several years. The course was well attended with personnel from a diverse set of roles across the laboratory. QPA management also intends to supplement the training with recurring workshops to sustain analyst development.

**Plutonium Facility–Safety Basis:** Last Friday, LANL management transmitted to the NNSA Field Office for approval the 2016 annual update to the documented safety analysis (DSA) and technical safety requirements (TSR). This submittal joins a large number of documents supporting the facility's safety basis, which currently consists of portions of DSA and TSR documents from 2015, 2014, and 2011, plus five Evaluation of the Safety of the Situation documents, two temporary modifications to the safety basis, and a different revision of the 2015 DSA and TSR awaiting implementation. Plutonium Facility management utilizes a 26-page TSR implementation matrix to facilitate configuration management of this challenging situation.

The approach to consolidate most of these documents relies on a different version of the 2014 DSA and TSR that contains a modern hazards analysis, but that remains under comment resolution with the NNSA Field Office. Once the comments are resolved, LANL safety basis analysts will then need to update this DSA and TSR to reflect the various changes that have occurred since it was originally drafted and then resubmit for NNSA approval. There is no formal schedule associated with this process, but considering additional time for implementation, safety basis personnel estimate that the facility is optimistically another year or two from achieving a consolidated, modern DSA and TSR.

**Area G–Inappropriately Remediated Nitrate Salts (RNS):** LANL, NNSA, and EM personnel continue to debate alternative approaches to the safety basis strategy formally submitted by LANL in April to support final treatment of the RNS wastes (see 4/22/16 weekly). The prolonged debate continues despite the fact that the first two revised safety basis documents for onsite transportation and the Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility are due next week according to the project plan.