

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 6, 2015

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending November 6, 2015

SRNS Operations: Recent actions and events include:

- SRNS issued their root cause analysis of the HB-Line event (see 9/11/15 report). Identified causes include: willful procedure violation, unwillingness to call a time out, significant departure from observed conduct of operations within this group, first line manager performance issue, and less than adequate management engagement.
- SRNS identified corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Besides personnel actions and broad actions previously discussed (see 9/18/15 report), SRNS will use a conduct of operations mentor in HB-Line and other facilities, complete small group sessions to confirm employees understand management expectations, conduct scenario-based training, and better define how the first and second line managers will function.
- SRNS issued a conduct of operations mentoring plan for their facilities.
- SRNS issued a sustainment plan to improve operational performance that includes initial and sustaining actions. The plan includes actions related to facility/organization/functional area self-assessments, independent and senior management review of self-assessments, externally led nuclear safety culture assessment, first line manager training, improving the contractor assurance system, and procedure and process improvements.
- H-Canyon entered deliberate operations mode this week.
- A worker descending the stairwell that is next to the H-Canyon stack fell and was found on a landing 50' above the ground, gripping the handrail and non-responsive. The investigation is examining possible medical causes and restrictions along with environmental conditions.

Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF): During the six-month inspection of the TRU Waste Storage Area, a DOE facility representative identified that the inspection criteria for the credited structural integrity program were incorrectly identified in the inspection procedure. The procedure had correctly identified acceptance criteria for closed concrete culverts (no spalling > 1.5 inches), but the inspection criteria for the concrete box overpacks (CBOs) also used no spalling >1.5 inches instead of the specified 0.9 inches. Pad 26 currently has 2 CBOs that have been on the pad for over two years. Upon discovery of the error, these CBOs were inspected to the correct criteria and found to meet the acceptance criteria.

Recommendation 2012-1, Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety: SRNS personnel have made significant progress in completing activities in the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) facility. The water-filled windows for cells six to nine have been drained and the outer windows for cells six to eight have been removed. The removal of the window for cell nine will require additional effort since the area in front of the window must first be cleared of the cameras and associated wiring that transmits safety data to the control room. This activity requires the entry into the Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) and close coordination between the laboratory and the recommendation project team. The site is expected to enter this LCO early next week and remove the cell 9 window shortly after that. The removal of the windows will allow for the installation of lights and the ability to perform a more detailed non-destructive assay of the cells.