

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 25, 2016

MEMO TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: Jason Anderson, Acting Pantex Plant Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending March 25, 2016

Extent of Condition Evaluation: On March 21st, CNS began an extent of condition review to assess whether systemic vulnerabilities exist in the current work control process. Recent operational events where work was performed without having had hazards properly analyzed and documented, work was performed without authorization, or approved work was performed that was not released, have indicated that there may be latent deficiencies in the work control process that may be more significant than simple contributing factors (for example see 3/11/16 and 2/5/16 reports). The extent of condition review will look at these various instances using a pilot method designed to more effectively identify cross-cutting issues and will use the results of the review to inform future improvements. The new method utilizes a Same-Similar Analysis to help identify situations and conditions that may contribute to a comparable violation of the work control process. The acting site representative attended the first meeting of the extent of condition team, and notes that although the method can lead to an exhaustive identification of conditions and causes that are key contributors to these occurrences, the resolution of these conditions remains governed by the current corrective action instructions.

Emergency Management: On March 22nd, CNS conducted a training drill to practice recent improvements in emergency response. The drill scenario involved an explosion in a nuclear facility with a quantity of material many times the facility limit, which caused an offsite radiological release and declaration of a General Emergency. Recently the Emergency Response Organization has implemented a web-like Emergency Management Information System (EMInS) that improves information exchange capabilities among response organizations, and updated the Safe-Route software and the associated instruction to more easily identify routes for emergency responders to take while activating the Emergency Operations Center. The purpose of this drill was to practice using these capabilities while evaluating the Emergency Response Organization checklist and improving communications between response organizations. A large number of personnel also used this drill as part of their qualifications; improving the CNS capacity to respond to an emergency situation. The acting site representative observed the stand-up of the Emergency Operations Center, the conduct of the drill, and the informal hot-wash, which identified potential improvements in drill realism, additional engineering involvement in drill development, and modifying the way information is disseminated to field response teams.

Nuclear Explosive Safety Order Deviation Request: CNS has submitted to NNSA a request to deviate from the nominal authorization sequence outlined in the DOE 452 series of Orders governing Nuclear Explosive Safety for a future study. The request stipulates that the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group (NESSG), which provides an independent evaluation of the safety of the proposed operation, will utilize a “high-quality” draft of the Hazard Analysis Report, rather than a final, approved version. The Hazard Analysis Report identifies all analyzed hazards the unit may potentially be exposed to during the proposed operation. As a compensatory measure, the NESSG will evaluate any changes between the high-quality draft and the final report and determine whether these changes affect Nuclear Explosive Safety in accordance with NNSA Supplemental Directive 452.2D, *Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation Processes*.