

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 29, 2016

MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: Zachery Beauvais, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending January 29, 2016

DNFSB Staff Activity: J. Deplitch was onsite to observe an emergency exercise.

Emergency Exercise: On January 27, 2016, the Pantex Plant performed an emergency exercise demonstrating the activation of an alternate, offsite emergency operations center (AEOC). The exercise was conducted in the evening, outside normal work hours, and required plant emergency response personnel to respond to a simulated release of sulfur dioxide from an offsite accident involving a derailed traincar. The exercise included no field play. Rather, controllers in a simulation cell provided scenario specific details to players in the operations center (OC) and AEOC. The site representative and a member of the Board's staff observed the exercise from the OC and AEOC. Plant Shift Superintendents in the OC promptly categorized the event as an offsite hazardous material release and initiated onsite protective actions after receiving reports of the train derailment and plant personnel experiencing symptoms consistent with sulfur dioxide inhalation. They later categorized the emergency as a mass casualty event as well. During the hotwash conducted immediately following the exercise, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), and NNSA Production Office (NPO) personnel noted deficiencies with the availability of technology resources within the AEOC. The site representative and staff member observed that communications during the exercise suffered due to the absence of such resources. Additionally, the site representative notes that the value of the exercise in demonstrating the ability to activate the AEOC during emergency conditions was compromised due to prior information provided to exercise players on the date and location of the exercise.

Removal of Workstand: This week, CNS Tooling and Machine Design completed an engineering evaluation of the loads applied to the workstand and a piece of special tooling during a recent operation that caused the special tooling to bend (see 1/22/2016 report). The engineering evaluation determined that the workstand columns did not carry load in the configuration following the event. The evaluation also determined that the loads encountered during continued disassembly of the unit will not cause additional plastic deformation of the special tooling bent during the initial event, and this piece of special tooling would be capable of supporting loads encountered prior to its replacement. On January 28, Production Technicians (PT) executed a Nuclear Explosive Engineering Procedure to transfer the unit to a new workstand and remove the previous workstand and special tooling from service.

Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) Revision: On January 22, 2016, NPO issued a Safety Evaluation Report approving a revision and extension to the previously approved JCO addressing non-compliant fire doors installed in a special nuclear material facility (see 8/28/2015 and 9/25/2015 reports). Following the initial submittal of the JCO, CNS has completed additional evaluations of all but two of the non-compliant fire doors to demonstrate equivalency to the required fire rating. In their approval of the revised JCO, NPO included one condition of approval requiring CNS to continue performing compensatory measures until the NPO Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) formally approves the equivalencies to industry requirements. The NPO AHJ approved the equivalencies on January 28. Combustible exclusion areas, verified by periodic walkdowns, remain in place for the areas not covered by the equivalencies.