## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO:Steven Stokes, Technical DirectorFROM:Zachery Beauvais, Pantex Site RepresentativeSUBJECT:Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending October 2, 2015

**Approval of Justifications for Continued Operations (JCO) and Limited Special Nuclear Material Work:** This week, the NNSA Production Office approved JCOs related to degraded and missing fire penetration seals in a warehouse facility and non-compliant fire doors in a special nuclear material facility (see 8/28/2015and 9/25/2015 reports). The JCO for the noncompliant fire door was supported by a computational fire model. The model simulated activation of nearby sprinkler heads and relied upon their functionality to support the determined combustible standoff distances. NPO issued the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which contained one condition of approval, requiring specific actions when entering a Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) for the fire suppression system. The Technical Safety Requirements normally allow CNS to reduce combustible loading in the facility or implement a fire watch if the system is impaired. Per the condition of approval, CNS must now implement a fire watch if conditions warrant entry to the LCO during the duration of the JCO.

Following approval of the JCO and release of the associated SER related to the non-compliant fire doors, CNS completed an implementation verification review and issued required facility access training on its provisions. On October 2, the site representative observed CNS personnel begin packaging radioisotopic thermoelectric generators in this facility.

**Nuclear Explosive Movements:** CNS personnel performed multiple nuclear explosive movements this week including the move postponed due to an error in the Integrated Production, Planning and Execution System (IPRO) (see 9/25/2015 report). This particular movement was conducted to allow CNS to repurpose a nuclear explosive bay in order to support a tooling tryout in preparation for an upcoming weapon disassembly campaign. Startup of the campaign is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2016 and will require a Federal Readiness Assessment and Nuclear Explosive Safety Study. On October 1, the site representative attended a Causal Analysis-Mistake Proofing meeting conducted to address the underlying causes of the IPRO error that had postponed the move. CNS is still determining the appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the error.

A nuclear explosive move was performed this week which allowed CNS to exit the LCO for a nuclear explosive bay. On September 25, CNS entered the LCO for the safety class deluge fire suppression system in one bay after a Det-Tronics Fire Alarm Control Panel relayed a trouble signal to the Pantex Emergency Services Dispatch Center. A similar trouble signal had been sent from the same Det-Tronics Panel for an error related to a different facility in the same building in early September (see 9/11/2015 and 9/18/2015). CNS has not yet determined the cause of each of these errors.

**Power Distribution System Maintenance:** This week, CNS and electrical subcontractors continued a maintenance outage of the South Main Substation of the Pantex electrical distribution system. CNS plans to conduct a similar outage of the North Main Substation in the coming weeks.