

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 2, 2015

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: P. Fox and D. Gutowski Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending October 2, 2015

Tank Farms. The contractor completed the last set of calculations to conclude that the temperature PISA for pump hose cages (see Activity Report 7/31/2015) is not a positive unreviewed safety question. Related administrative restrictions were cleared.

A site rep observed field work to remove another pump from Tank AY-102. The removal went smoothly and radiation fields were lower than with previous pumps from AY-102.

D. Olson retired as President and Project Manager of the Tank Farms contractor and has been replaced by M. Lindholm. The contractor's Chief Engineer also recently resigned.

Waste Treatment Plant. ORP directed the contractor to complete and maintain the Laboratory Facility (LAB) as a HC-3 vice a radiological facility. However, since hot cell equipment is not required until the High Level Waste Facility starts operations, this equipment will be installed later. ORP also directed the contractor to complete the LAB DSA to support processes and modes for Low Activity Waste Facility (LAW) and Direct Feed LAW operations. Lastly, LAB readiness for startup will be determined through the performance of a DOE Order 425.1D compliant Readiness Assessment vice an Operational Readiness Review. This approach will require the approval of an equivalency request in accordance with DOE Order 251.1C.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). RL completed their review of the contractor's PFP demolition plan and determined that the document satisfies RL's requirements.

The contractor has started size reduction of the last high hazard glovebox (HA-9A). Management met with the work team to discuss hazards and hazard controls related to the work and how those hazards are different from previous work. The meeting was useful and identified a number of actions to help ensure safe and effective accomplishment of the work.

618-10 Burial Grounds. The contractor initiated augering and in-situ characterization of Vertical Pipe Units (VPU). They completed the first VPU and found no detectable radiation levels during characterization. The auger will require repairs before use on the next VPU.

Building 324. During maintenance of a scissor lift in a contamination area, workers encountered debris in a previously inaccessible portion of the lift. Analysis showed it was rad material. Upon recognition that this lift was surplus equipment from a different DOE site, the debris was tested for beryllium (Be) and results were above the control level. The contractor posted the lift as a Be controlled area and is performing actions to assess possible spread of Be contamination.

Site Wide Risk Review. The site rep attended a public meeting held by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation and Stakeholder Participation to discuss the interim report from their site wide risk review (see Activity Report 2/13/2015).