

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 25, 2015

MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: Zachery Beauvais, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending September 25, 2015

Nuclear Explosive Movement: On September 23, 2015, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) attempted a nuclear explosive movement performed by non-bargaining unit personnel. CNS had previously authorized and resumed a range of transportation activities for a single nuclear weapon program (see 9/11/2015 and 9/18/2015 reports); however, the movement planned for this week involved a unit from a separate program to be moved in an Enhanced Transportation Cart, Type I. Lightning warnings were in effect at the time of the scheduled move. Per the associated procedure, the plant Operations Center is allowed to override the lightning restriction and perform moves in this configuration. During this process, an error occurred in the Integrated Production, Planning, and Execution System (IPRO) that disallowed the override. CNS conducted, and the site representative attended, a critique related to this issue. The error was related to a database change performed on September 8. Participants at the critique stated that the latent error could have been discovered sooner had the plant been operating as normal. Participants at a September 18 critique on a security lock issue (see entry below) expressed a similar sentiment.

Security Locks: Last week, CNS discovered that a single lock had been installed on a facility that was required to have two locks. The facility in question does not house nuclear explosives or special nuclear material but does contain Category I electrical testers requiring two-person concept protection per the Department of Energy *Nuclear Explosive Safety Order*. CNS conducted, and the site representative attended, a critique related to this issue. CNS personnel had installed both required locks following walkdowns conducted to verify the facility configuration prior to the work stoppage (see 8/28/2015 report). On September 5, fire department personnel entered the facility to perform routine inspections. The Fire Department is not required to notify CNS facility management before this type of inspection. The primary CNS Facility Representative (FR) for this facility was on vacation when Security personnel discovered that there was only one lock installed. The backup FR was informed of the condition, but did not take additional actions to verify that this configuration was allowed. When the primary CNS FR returned, he was aware that the installed configuration was not allowed. Hand-off of FR duties can be conducted verbally or via email—it does not require a visual verification of facility status. A review of access records verified that the Fire Department personnel were the only individuals to enter the facility between the verification walkdowns and discovery of the lock issue.

Fire Barrier Justifications for Continued Operations (JCO): This week, CNS submitted two JCOs to the NNSA Production Office (NPO) to continue operations in facilities where CNS fire protection engineers had discovered degraded and missing fire penetration seals and non-compliant fire doors (see 8/28/2015 and 9/4/2015 reports). The JCO addressing the degraded fire penetration seals proposes implementing 5 foot and 10 foot combustible standoff distances around areas with affected penetrations, depending on the wall thickness and location, and inspecting the standoff areas every two weeks until compliant seals are installed. The JCO addressing the non-compliant fire doors implements 5 foot standoff distances and weekly inspections in some areas and relies on fire simulation to justify the ability of the fire suppression system to prevent fire propagation in other areas. NPO is currently reviewing the JCOs.