

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 11, 2015

**MEMO TO:** Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Zachery Beauvais, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending September 11, 2015

**Operations Status:** Nuclear explosive work remains paused following the expiration of the extension to the collective bargaining agreement between Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) and the unions representing Pantex bargaining unit employees (see 8/28/2015 report). Non-bargaining unit employees continued to perform maintenance within the plant this week, including preventive maintenance on safety systems in nuclear explosive bays and cells.

**Verification of Readiness to Restart Transportation Operations:** On September 4, 2015, CNS transmitted a Startup Notification Report to the National Nuclear Security Administration Production Office (NPO), communicating their intent to demonstrate readiness for transportation supervisory personnel to perform nuclear explosive moves. This week, the site representative observed demonstrations and briefings conducted as part of a readiness verification and contractor readiness assessment (CRA) for these operations. CNS determined a CRA was necessary due to the significant changes to staffing resulting from the work stoppage. NPO concurred with this determination and provided federal personnel to shadow most aspects of the CRA. The scope of the operations demonstrated in the CRA includes nuclear explosive transportation for one nuclear weapon program within and between Material Access Areas. Five of the core requirements applicable to CRAs, as described in DOE Order 425.1D, were excluded from the scope of this assessment. In most cases, the exclusion was justified based on the limited scope of changes necessary to support these operations. However, a core requirement related to emergency management drill and exercise program implementation was excluded from the CRA scope and supplanted by a one-on-one interview between a CRA team member and the Emergency Management Program Manager, as part of the CRA team's efforts to verify that safety management programs are available to support transportation operations. The CRA is ongoing at the time of this report.

CNS Nuclear and Explosive Safety (NES) personnel previously performed a Contractor NES Change Evaluation (CNCE), based on the possibility for conducting selected operations during a potential work stoppage. The CNCE concluded that the proposed operations did not violate the assumptions of previously approved NES evaluations; however, CNS NES required additional observations to verify that transportation activities could be conducted within the applicable DOE requirements. A representative from CNS NES observed the demonstrations for the readiness verification to validate this conclusion and a separate CNS NES representative participated as a member of the CRA team.

**Fire Alarm Control Panel Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO):** On September 3, 2015, CNS entered an LCO for the safety class deluge fire suppression system in one nuclear explosive bay after a Det-Tronics Fire Alarm Control Panel relayed a trouble signal to the Pantex Emergency Services Dispatch Center. The required actions of the LCO had already been met, as CNS had verified the operations in the facility to be safe and stable and had placed the facility in maintenance mode prior to the work stoppage (see 8/28/2015 report). The fire suppression system in the affected facility remains inoperable while CNS Fire Protection Engineers continue to troubleshoot the cause of the trouble signal.