

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 7, 2015

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: P. Fox and D. Gutowski Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending August 7, 2015

Tank Farms. The contractor held safety stand-down briefings regarding recent lockout/tagout (LOTO) events and the planned path forward. The contractor lifted the suspension of packages under LOTO with the issuance of a new standing order that requires that any work activity that involves a LOTO, modifies a facility with a permanent or temporary engineering change notice, or is an inter-farm activity be reviewed and approved by a new Supplemental Work Integration Team prior to release. Long term corrective actions are being developed.

The contractor decanted approximately 220,000 gallons of supernate from Tank AN-106 to Tank AP-104 to support continued retrieval of Tank C-105.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Radiological Work Permit void limits were exceeded twice this week. The first case occurred when the containment on a piece of ducting was damaged resulting in a release of contamination that was subsequently discovered during routine work surveys. In the second case, the airborne radioactivity void limit was exceeded while workers were cleaning the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon floor. In each case, the contractor conducted reviews and is implementing changes to work methods to preclude similar events. The site reps note that, over the last two months, there has been an increase in the number of radiological events and work related injuries. These increases coincide with the increasing trend in the complexity and quantity of work being accomplished. While the contractor is taking appropriate action for each case, these actions do not appear to be curtailing the overall trend.

RL approved the contractor's request to delay implementation of the next DSA revision until the contractor completes HC-9B and HA-9A size reduction. The delay retains confinement ventilation as a safety-significant control during size reduction activities.

Waste Treatment Plant. The contractor completed a risk assessment of erosion and localized corrosion of system components in Pretreatment Facility black cells and hard to reach areas. They concluded that the risk for unacceptable degradation is low and that implementation of the standard high solids vessel design will further reduce risk. ORP is evaluating this conclusion

242-A Evaporator. The site rep observed incident scene activities for an emergency preparedness drill at the 242-A Evaporator. The scenario was a large leak of the process condensate tank during an evaporator campaign which resulted in injuries to a worker.

ORP's Senior Review Board recommended approval of a safety basis amendment for the evaporator that implements one of three planned design/operational improvements and removes the associated compensatory administrative control (see Activity Report 4/10/2015).

Building 324. The contractor submitted the 100% design package for remediation of the contaminated soil underneath B-Cell at Building 324 to RL.

222-S Laboratory. The site rep observed hot cell work to extrude three core samples from tank SY-103. The first sample was still liquid, and the next two were solid with minimal free liquid.