

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending May 29, 2015

Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC): Earlier this month, the DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) approved Revision 31 of the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). OREM's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) included one condition of approval (COA). The COA is related to safety controls that are engineered features that have yet to be procured because they are long lead items. These controls are vehicle impact barriers for a small exterior work area and a dike around the standby diesel generator. Until the permanent controls are installed, the DSA credits temporary concrete Jersey barriers and the double-walled construction of the generator's fuel tank as temporary alternative controls. OREM's COA requires the permanent features to be installed and incorporated into a revision of the TSR within six months of the issuance of the SER, which is dated May 1, 2015.

On May 7, WAI held an out-briefing for their management self-assessment (MSA) to verify they are ready to implement Revision 31 to the DSA and TSR (see 4/10/15 report). The MSA team found a significant number of issues that were rolled up into eight findings. Examples of the issues were: no clear linkage between TSR and several operating procedures, a lack of commercial grade dedication (CGD) documentation for several new safety class and safety significant (SS) components (namely, the CGD of cargo containers used for drum storage and credited in reducing the consequences of fire events), no engineering evaluation of the SS concrete vehicle impact barriers, no procedure to implement segregation of safety-related parts in material storage areas per DOE G 433.1-1A, and that personnel demonstrated incomplete knowledge of the changes to the DSA/TSR. WAI has been working on addressing these findings for the last three weeks. This week, WAI's Director of Operations confirmed that corrective actions are complete and they are ready to start the formal Independent Verification Review (IVR). The IVR is planned to take about a week and will include a demonstration of the canister overpack that will be used during the transfer of remote-handled waste to UCOR storage facilities.

Building 9212: Last week, Radiological Control (RADCON) personnel discovered levels of removable contamination during surveys around a dust collection system. This system collects dust from the ventilation of the vacuum induction melt furnaces and other E-wing operations. This system is part of the Stack 110 upgrades that replaced the bag filter house and was put into service in December 2013 (see 11/15/13 report). The system has backflow and internal air pulse features that allow built-up dust to be collected. These features have been operated more often recently and may have exposed a leak in the system that caused the contamination found in several isolated locations. Production management has created a recovery plan to facilitate decontamination and investigation into the cause of the loss of confinement of the dust.

Building 9206: Last week, during a routine tour of the 9206 complex, a Shift Manager discovered that several installed HEPA filters in an auxiliary building had expired testing stickers. The filters were required to be tested once a year and the testing was due on March 19, 2015. Normally, the site's automated tracking system notifies the facility that the testing is required a few months before it is due, but the point of contact in the automated system was a person in a different organization who was unaware of the purpose of the notification. RADCON personnel conducted surveys of affected areas and did not note any anomalies.