

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 15, 2015

**MEMO TO:** Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Ramsey Arnold, Acting Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending May 15, 2015

**Anomalous Unit Update:** On May 13, 2015, Production Technicians (PT) successfully executed the Nuclear Explosive Engineering Procedure (NEEP) for disassembly of an anomalous unit with cracked high explosive (see reports dated 1/30/15 and 5/1/15). Prior to executing the work, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) developed and trained PTs to the NEEP, the NNSA-led Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) Study Group reviewed the operations, the NNSA Production Office (NPO) approved the operation, and CNS performed the Implementation Verification Review. The Acting Site Representative observed the operation and noted a well-controlled process that was executed effectively. NPO, CNS, NNSA NES, and Design Agency personnel were also present to observe the operation.

**Weapon Complex Falling Man Committee (WCFMC):** On May 13-14, 2015, CNS Special Tooling & Tester Design personnel held the second meeting of the WCFMC. The long-term effort of the WCFMC, as chartered in the first meeting in April, is to develop a standard model for Falling Man insult scenarios to be used across the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise. Committee members from Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Atomic Weapons Establishment participated, while members from Los Alamos National Laboratory and NNSA were unable to attend.

**Quality Assurance:** Last week, CNS personnel discovered that duplicate serial numbers associated with a subassembly were used on two separate war reserve units. CNS held an event critique and determined that a production planner incorrectly entered a randomly generated serial number into the Integrated Program Planning and Execution (IPRO) system for association with and stamping of the subassembly. Following assembly completion in April 2015, the unit was turned over to Enterprise Planning & Control personnel who discovered that the serial number entered by the production planner was already associated to a subassembly completed in 2014. CNS has issued a Standing Order to prevent future occurrences by checking that a serial number has not been previously issued prior to the issuance of any randomly generated serial number. Further, CNS intends to improve the configuration management of nuclear explosive operational records in the IPRO system.

**Explosives Safety Limits:** Last week, CNS paused operations in a facility due to a discrepancy between the facility explosive limits documented in the Maximum Limits List (MLL) and the Explosives Safety Site Plan (ESSP). During the review of a proposed change to the MLL, CNS Explosives Safety personnel noticed that an explosives limit listed in the MLL and consistent with the Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) is higher than the limit documented in the ESSP, and that the amount of explosives in the facility exceeded the ESSP limit. Because the amount of explosives did not exceed the TSR limit, no TSR violation occurred. Upon discovery, CNS personnel completed the operation in progress and then suspended further operations until CNS approves an alternate location for the operations. Previously, CNS declared a TSR violation when this facility exceeded the TSR limit (see report dated 3/27/15), however, this discrepancy was not discovered at the time. The facility is non-nuclear; the TSR limit exists to preclude impact to an adjacent nuclear facility.