

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending April 10, 2015

Staff member R. Arnold was on-site this week supporting the staff's on-going review of NNSA Production Office (NPO) oversight.

Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC): Last February, the DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) sent a letter to inform Wastren Advantage, Inc. (WAI) that OREM will be implementing an enhanced oversight plan at TWPC (see 2/13/15 report). This week, the site rep visited TWPC to observe OREM's enhanced oversight activities. OREM had two facility representatives (an additional assigned facility representative was on leave this week) and a support subcontractor conducting oversight. The site rep observed that each of these oversight personnel were present for WAI's shift turnover activities and proceeded to watch three different WAI activities (hourly plant rounds, fire system maintenance, and a specific administrative control surveillance). The observed OREM oversight activities met the objectives described in the enhanced oversight plan.

On March 31, 2015, WAI submitted a revision to the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for OREM approval. This revision incorporates a significant number of changes that include a revised control strategy to address increased potential dose consequences resulting from applying new atmospheric dispersion modeling. The revision also addresses the deployment of an overpack for remote-handled (RH) canisters and controls from several outstanding Justifications for Continued Operations (JCOs), such as the JCO associated with a container detonation hazard (see 5/23/14 report). Both OREM and WAI have expressed the desire to implement the revised DSA and complete readiness activities and deployment of the RH overpacks prior to the start of contractor transition, which is scheduled to start early in June.

This week, WAI held a kick-off meeting for a management self-assessment (MSA) for the implementation of the latest DSA revision. OREM personnel are still reviewing the submitted revision but they plan to complete the Safety Evaluation Report on April 20, 2015. The MSA is being conducted to aid WAI management in ensuring that they are ready for an Independent Verification Review (IVR). WAI will start its IVR after OREM's approval of the DSA. In addition, OREM will conduct a concurrent but separate IVR, which is consistent with OREM's commitment to conduct its own IVRs after the site rep identified weaknesses in a contractor IVR conducted in August 2014 (see 9/12/14 report).

Building 9212/Conduct of Operations: Last week, Building 9212 Production personnel performed fissile operations in an area where nuclear criticality safety (NCS) engineering had placed fissile operations on hold. The basis for the operational hold was an NCS concern that the loss of fluid from a seal pot in the drain line for a ventilation system could present an unanalyzed NCS condition. Due to poor shift turnover practices and poor communication with the shift manager, the Production supervisor for the activity was not aware of the NCS restriction. This event is the latest in a series of recent events (see 4/3/15 report) that demonstrate less than adequate safety performance. The Senior Director for Nuclear Operations Support plans to hold a critique with responsible facility management next week to evaluate these recent events collectively, and identify any common causes and potential broad-based corrective actions.