

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 4, 2014

MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending July 4, 2014

DNFSB Staff on Site: J. Mercier was at the Pantex Plant this week to provide site representative support.

Potential Inadequacy of the Safety Analysis (PISA) and Negative Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Determination for Unanalyzed Functional Requirement: Late last week, Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex, LLC (B&W) declared a PISA when a tooling engineer discovered that B&W had not analyzed whether the load path of the mass properties fixture met the functional requirement to support the fixture under normal and seismic loading while above the unit. B&W discovered the PISA while preparing an authorization basis change package to move hoisting events associated with mass properties operations from the Sitewide Safety Analysis Report (SAR) to the Mass Properties SAR. On the same day, B&W declared a negative USQ determination. B&W stated in the USQ that the new tooling analysis of the load path met the normal and seismic loading functional requirements. B&W declared the negative USQ determination because there was no increase in probability or consequence of a previously analyzed accident, no increase in probability or consequence of an equipment malfunction, and there was no creation of an accident type not previously evaluated in the existing safety basis. Operations have resumed.

New Management and Operating Contractor: This week, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) assumed management and operating responsibilities of the Pantex Plant.

Approval to use Hoist with Expired Quarterly In-Service Inspection: The NNSA Production Office (NPO) issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) approving the use of a hoist with an expired quarterly in-service inspection in one facility. The hoist is needed to perform a limited number of steps in the Nuclear Explosive Operating Procedure in order to move a unit with a cracked non-energetic component out of the facility. (See reports for 4/18/2014 and 6/20/2014.) NPO approved the Evaluation of the Safety of the Situation based on the limited consequences of a burning dispersal and material release and the pre-operational hoist check which tests most of the hoist functions. CNS plans to move the unit out of the facility until the path forward on the unit can be determined with input from the Design Agencies.

Pause of Nuclear Explosive Operations: CNS paused operations in one facility when the Production Technicians (PTs) noticed a detonator cable assembly (DCA) locator was dislodged from the high explosives during installation of the DCA. The PTs returned the DCA to the workbench to establish a safe and stable configuration. CNS process engineer, authorization basis, and nuclear explosive safety concurred that the unit was in a safe and stable configuration. CNS has issued a non-conformance on the high explosive part and the locator. There was no special nuclear material in the facility at the time of the event.