DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 17, 2014

MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending January 17, 2014

Anomalous Unit: Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex, LLC (B&W) performed the Implementation Verification Review (IVR) to place the anomalous unit into a transportation configuration, transport the unit to the Linear Accelerator (LINAC) facility, perform radiography, and if the results are normal, transport the unit to a bay for normal disassembly operations. (See report for 1/10/2014.) Following the successful completion of the IVR, B&W transported the anomalous unit to the LINAC facility and performed the radiography. The results of the radiography were negative and B&W is proceeding with disassembly of the unit.

Failure of Ultra-Violet (UV) Flame Detector: B&W Emergency Services Dispatch Center (ESDC) received a trouble alarm from a UV flame detector in a nuclear explosive operating facility. B&W Fire Department personnel responded and silenced and tagged out the fire alarm control panel. B&W Fire Protection personnel walked down the facility and determined that a fire watch was not required. B&W entered the appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). Two hours later, B&W Maintenance personnel reported to the ESDC that the deluge system had been restored; however they did not exit the LCO out of concerns that there was still something wrong with the UV flame detector. Shortly after restoring the system, the ESDC received another trouble signal and dispatched the Fire Department to investigate. This time, B&W Fire Protection personnel established an hourly fire watch until repairs could be made. B&W Fire Technicians replaced two UV detector heads and the trouble signal cleared. B&W exited the LCO.

Weapon Trainer Hardware Fidelity: B&W decided to temporarily package Canned Sub-Assemblies (CSA) for one weapon program into DT-19 containers instead of the over-the-road approved DT-23 containers. B&W doesn't have the DT-23 containers at this time. B&W will only use the DT-19 containers for on-site transportation and staging. The Site Representative was in the facility when the Production Technicians (PTs) were loading the first DT-19 for this purpose. The PTs had loaded the CSA into the inner container and placed the lid on the inner container when they realized the gap between the lid and the container did not resemble what they had seen in the training bay. The PTs paused the operation and contacted the Production Section Manager. The PTs stated that the harness used to hoist the CSA into the inner container was newer and thicker than the one used in the training bay. The difference in thickness of the harness accounted for the gap between the inner container and the lid. B&W Process Engineers are writing a Nuclear Explosive Engineering Procedure to back out of the process far enough to change out the sling, and then re-assemble the inner container.

While in the facility, the Site Representative noticed that this facility does not have an ASME NUM-1 nuclear qualified hoist. The Cell facility is set up to accommodate two hoists, however only one hoist was in the facility at this time. B&W Engineering personnel told the Site Representative that this Cell facility is scheduled to have two ASME NUM-1 nuclear qualified hoists installed when funding permits.