

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 17, 2014

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending January 17, 2014

**Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP).** In response to the degradation of rigorous work practices (see Activity Report 1/10/14), senior PFP contractor managers met with subordinate managers and supervisors. This was followed by a half-day safety pause where the managers led discussions with workers about the “drift” away from the good work practices that had been established at PFP during recent years. Degraded practices included: pre-job briefs where the supervisor read aloud the work steps; place keeping in work documents; additional management presence in the field; and quarterly coaching sessions for field work supervisors and senior supervisory oversight (SSO) personnel. During the various meetings, the managers addressed 14 specific examples where field work documents were not followed during the last four months. Some workers expressed their frustration with work documents that could not be worked in a practical manner. The managers responded that these issues need to be identified and then the documents would need to be revised before work was performed. Other worker comments included: workers were not involved with the work planning process, management had not been communicating with workers, workers were unaware of the growing number of work document non-compliances, and workers perceived that schedule had priority over safety. PFP managers are evaluating how to correct these problems.

One of the compensatory actions implemented last week was to increase the number of SSO activities where a manager is assigned to mentor work supervisors and workers. Early this week, an SSO had to stop workers from proceeding with a preventive maintenance procedure that could not be performed as written.

**River Corridor Closure.** Material in a 30-gallon waste drum ignited while it was being processed in the north trench of the 618-10 burial ground. Per their procedure, workers immediately extinguished the fire with dirt and called the fire department; they then conducted an orderly exit from the area. The contractor has not detected any spread of radiological material.

The site rep observed the successful initial lift of the Building 340 vault (see Activity Report 8/16/2013).

**Tank Farms.** Last week, contractor personnel questioned whether the waste transfer system should have been locked out prior to performing work on the MARS-V system being installed in tank C-105. Electrical hazards were locked out, but the possibility of waste presence in the work area had not been considered. The contractor stopped the job and determined that they had not isolated a potential hazard.

**Waste Treatment Plant.** The Office of River Protection (ORP) rejected an Authorization Basis Amendment Request in which the contractor proposed downgrading the safety-significant gamma monitor interlock in the Analytical Laboratory to non-safety. ORP stated that they believed any such proposal could be resubmitted following completion of final control selection for the laboratory.