

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 15, 2013

**MEMO To:** Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending November 15, 2013

**Plant-Wide Loss of Power Event:** On Tuesday, Babcock & Wilcox Pantex (B&W) experienced a plant-wide loss of electrical power. The utility power company noticed “galloping” on the feed coming into the Pantex plant and manually tripped the breaker supplying the plant. The plant was not notified that the power would be temporarily lost. The plant was without electrical power for approximately three minutes.

Shortly after power was restored, the Operations Center personnel made a public address announcement for all operations to be placed in a safe and stable configuration and all transportation activities to be suspended. B&W Facility Representatives entered most nuclear explosive operating facilities into the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO), for an unplanned impairment of the fire protection system. Shortly after B&W started performing the required actions in the LCO, the B&W Fire Protection Engineers decided there was no need to enter the LCO if power had been restored to the fire alarm control panels. B&W also entered two LCOs for the loss of the water level alarm in the High Pressure Fire Loop water supply tanks. The Fire Department responded and manually measured the tank levels, which were nominal. The Fire Department also responded to one fire alarm, one facility reporting the smell of smoke, and another reporting the smell of natural gas. One back-up diesel generator did not start, and one had an anti-freeze leak and was shut down.

B&W did not activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), although B&W called key personnel to the EOC and coordinated and directed activities from the EOC. B&W does not have an Emergency Action Level (EAL) for a plant-wide loss of power event, therefore declaring an emergency is left to the discretion of the Plant Shift Superintendent. Since there is no EAL for a loss of power, B&W had no plan for how to respond to the event, and B&W had never performed any drills for such an event. The Site Representative observed some complicated Operations Center (OC) communication difficulties associated with this event. The Production Technicians in nuclear explosive facilities are directed by procedure to call the OC when the facility they occupy loses power. This resulted in a significant number of calls to the OC. There are 139 fire alarm control panels (FACPs) on site. All 139 FACPs simultaneously auto-dial into the dispatch center to report a loss of power. Thirty five FACPs did not report in or gave up the auto-dial after a prescribed number of attempts. B&W is still reviewing this data. In all, there were more than 900 signals sent to the dispatch center.

There was a secondary event approximately one hour after the initial power outage that shut down the data center and all classified and unclassified computing for several hours. B&W is still investigating this event.

**Walker/Spotter Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Violation:** This week, B&W declared a TSR violation for a walker/spotter event that happened on October 29, 2013. (See report for 11/1/2013.) B&W paused all on-site transportation and is briefing all production and transportation personnel on the requirements in the TSR.