

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 13, 2013

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending September 13, 2013

R. Quirk was off site this week.

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP).** Hazards analyses (HA) resumed this week following the management suspension of work due to an Office of River Protection (ORP) concern regarding the safety classification of the software used to support HAs (see Activity Report 8/30/2013). ORP and the contractor have reached initial agreement that the HA software does not need to be classified as safety software so long as it is used only as a database. The site rep observed a training session on the current usage restrictions for the software. This training was required for all HA core team personnel prior to resuming participation in HAs. Completion of this training was verified by the HA leads as the HA sessions resumed.

**Tank Farms.** The contractor initiated a root cause analysis to evaluate the alert in C farm (see Activity Report 8/30/2013). The analysis will focus on both the adequacy and consistency of the radiation reading levels that trip alerts as well as why the legacy contamination that triggered the alert was undiscovered until recently.

An ORP Facility Representative noted that training on the modified radiological monitoring controls that were part of the C-101 corrective actions appear inadequate following observations of the training and discussions with field personnel. The contractor took immediate action to retrain personnel on these controls.

The contractor's Plant Review Committee approved changes to the Tank Farms safety basis. One change clarified temperature monitoring requirements in a Specific Administrative Control (SAC) for the waste transfer system. This SAC was added to the safety basis as part of the closure of the Justification for Continued Operations on freeze protection (see Activity Report 11/9/2012). The SAC now explicitly defines which temperature readings do not require accuracy verification.

ORP approved the contractor's revised Unreviewed Safety Question procedure.

The contractor successfully removed a corrosion probe from tank AY-102. The probe was cut into pieces in a glovebag. The pieces will be analyzed at the 222-S Laboratory.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant.** Workers entered an Airborne Radioactivity Area (ARA) in the Plutonium Reclamation Facility without wearing respirators. They realized they were in an ARA after discovering a posting at the other side of the ARA. Upon exiting, they noted that there was no ARA posting at their point of entry. The team reported their ARA entry without proper protection and received nasal smears which were less than detectable.

The contractor discovered two sprinkler deficient areas that did not have the proper postings in accordance with a SAC. They completed the required actions defined in the SAC for Non-Sprinklered areas.