

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 9, 2013

TO: S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending August 9, 2013

Board staff member, Ryan Eul, was on site observing a URS corporate team review SRR's implementation of the site's work planning and control program. The review continues next week.

Recommendation 2012-1: SRNS and SRR recently conducted a multi-facility F-Area drill to ensure that personnel could shelter properly in the event of a release of ^{238}Pu from Building 235-F. (See 7/19/2013 report). This week SRNS repeated portions of the drill to improve deficiencies encountered in the first coordinated drill. SRR chose to participate also. While SRR has yet to correct the hardware difficulties and some procedural deficiencies identified in the previous drill, F-Tank Farms personnel were able to successfully shelter in place with some minor deficiencies.

Tank Farms: The site rep attended a Facilities Radiological Action Team (FRAT) review of an SRR job to replace the transfer pump in F-Tank Farm Pump Pit 1 (FPP-1). The purpose of the pump is to transfer high-level waste from F to H-Tank farm. The pump and the surrounding pump pit are highly contaminated. In the site rep's opinion, the team did not satisfy the requirements in the FRAT's charter. For example, the FRAT's reviews of the package's controls, the radiological work permit, the As Low As Reasonably Achievable review, and the Assisted Hazards Analysis were not thorough. The work package owners did not even provide the latter two documents to the team for review. Afterwards, the site rep shared the above observations with the FRAT chairman, who decided to reconvene the FRAT at a later date.

Spent Fuel: Last Friday, the leak detection device for the Moderator Tank Storage Room in C-Reactor alarmed. C-Reactor is not operating and is not normally manned. The L-Reactor shift operations manager (SOM) sent the day shift first line manager (FLM) and an operator to C Reactor to access the Moderator Tank Storage Room (located in the basement) and determine if the indication could be from rain water intrusion, instrument error, an actual leak of contaminated moderator, or some other cause. There is a Specific Administrative Control (SAC) in place to verify the combustible loading in the room is less than 5K pounds upon exiting the room. The SAC requires either the FLM or operator to be formally qualified to complete the verification. Since the FLM had completed the required training courses, both the FLM and SOM believed he was qualified to implement the SAC. However, the FLM had not actually completed the formal qualification process.

HB-Line: While working in HB-Line, an operator found contamination on his outer pair of protective clothing (20,000 dpm α) and 1000 dpm α on the floor. A search found a damaged plastic bag-out sleeve in a nearby glove-box. The facility had last used the bag-out sleeve last winter. Operations personnel indicated that it should have been replaced with a glove when those operations ceased. SRNS personnel are working to determine if any other similar conditions exist at other facilities and if they should implement new requirements to date the sleeves with the installation date similar to gloves.