

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 5, 2013

TO: S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending July 5, 2013

L-Area: SRNS personnel found a stud that was not correctly attached to the wall while performing the 3-year preventive maintenance on the 70-ton cask superstructure. The stud should have been bolted into the wall and used to hold a shim in place. The shim supports the positioning of a rail that guides the cask into the correct position so that the superstructure can remove the lid. It serves no load bearing function. SRNS personnel believe that the stud was never properly inserted into the wall fastener assembly. SRNS checked the remainder of the accessible bolts and found them to be properly attached. Divers last checked the studs that are located below the water level three years ago.

Last weekend, SRNS called a timeout while performing the critical lift of a cask from the CD-3 Cask Car. When the 85-ton crane started the lift, it shutdown automatically and multiple faults were displayed. Management with engineering concurrence decided to bypass the interlocks in order to restart the crane and release the hooks from the cask, however, the crane would not respond. SRNS approved leaving the crane attached to the cask since it was in contact with the rail car surface. During trouble shooting, SRNS personnel determined that the east hoist overspeed switch failed. With that information, they were able to release the hooks and the crane returned to its maintenance position.

H-Canyon: During a loss-of-power test three weeks ago, a breaker failed to close (see June 14, 2013 report). During response actions, a second breaker failed to close too and H-Canyon was operating with only two exhaust fans. Afterwards, Engineering sent both breakers to the SRS breaker shop for preventive maintenance and troubleshooting. This identified a defective closed circuit microswitch on the first breaker, which was replaced. SRNS performed additional work on the associated switchgear. On Monday, H-Canyon conducted a second loss-of-power test that was observed by the site rep. This test was successful.

Recent camera inspections of one of the dissolvers confirmed that the lower cooling coil was the source of the observed leak (see February 1 and 8, 2013 reports).

Now that funds are available, H-Canyon personnel have also resumed preparations to inspect the integrity of the process air exhaust tunnel with both a pole camera and camera mounted on a crawler later this year (see January 6, 2012 report).