

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 10, 2013

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending May 10, 2013

**River Corridor Closure.** The contractor's parent company completed a review of the project's implementation of the work control process and concluded that the process was adequately implemented for four of the five core areas of Integrated Safety Management. At the outbrief, the review team identified 11 issues that were not compliant with requirements, nine opportunities for improvement and two best practices. The core area that was deemed less than adequate was performing work in accordance with approved work instructions and within established controls.

**Plateau Remediation Contractor.** This week, the contractor concluded that they forwarded a copy of a completed surveillance report to just one of two Richland Operations Office groups that were identified in the specific administrative controls. Last month, the contractor declared that a pressure differential indicator was inoperable because its most recent calibration data sheet from last year was missing a decimal point. These two problems share the same cause as an issue that was identified at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (see Activity Report 7/13/2012): there was no second check to ensure the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) had been met. The contractor will likely institute a new requirement that all TSR-related documents have at least two people review and concur that the requirements were met. Additionally, they are considering creating a consistent process for declaring a system operable.

**Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL).** During removal of ventilation ductwork, the contractor discovered two sprinkler heads in the safety-significant fire protection system that had been obscured by the ductwork. They declared a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis when they determined that the system was not compliant with the hydraulic calculations supporting the safety analysis because there were more sprinkler heads off a riser than allowed by the NFPA code. They subsequently completed an unreviewed safety question (USQ) determination and an evaluation of the safety of the situation which determined that it was not a USQ because there was sufficient margin in the water supply for the extra sprinkler heads.

**Tank Farms.** The Office of River Protection (ORP) released their suspension on tank dome cutting following resolution of a differing professional opinion (DPO) (see Activity Report 4/20/2012). The DPO concerned the potential impact to the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) from the addition of large amounts of abrasives to tank waste. This allows the contractor to make cuts in tank domes using abrasive water jet cutting with olivine or to use an alternative technology that meets the same health and safety expectations. The contractor is evaluating using a rotary concrete saw and the site rep observed testing of this unit. A hazards analysis for this method shows that it exhibits comparable worker hazards to the previously conducted water jet cuts.

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP).** ORP launched a large audit to review the implementation and effectiveness of the contractor's quality assurance program. Personnel from DOE headquarters are supporting the ORP review as well as evaluating the appropriate response to an exemption request from the current version of the DOE quality assurance order, and the EM Corporate Quality Assurance Manual.