

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 8, 2013

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending March 8, 2013

**River Corridor Project.** The contractor identified large uncertainties in the non-destructive assay results for drums that contain concrete shielding and is therefore upgrading the hazard categorization for retrieving drums from the 618-10 burial ground to Hazard Category (HC) -3. This upgrade will require the development of a DSA and TSR. The contractor plans to request an exemption for the requirement to conduct an Operational Readiness Review but, based on their experience with retrieving drums from this burial ground, conduct a Readiness Assessment.

**Tank Farms.** The contractor completed field work for video inspections of six double-shell tank (DST) annuli. This is part of the extent of condition review following the primary tank leak in DST AY-102 (see Activity Report 11/16/2013). Engineering is still evaluating the videos but has so far seen no evidence of additional primary tank leaks.

The contractor completed video inspection of single-shell (SST) tank BX-110. This tank is one of the SSTs under evaluation for water intrusion. The video showed more liquid in the tank than expected. The contractor is continuing with additional inspections of SSTs that show increasing or decreasing level behavior.

The DOE Office of Environmental Management announced that treatment, packaging, and disposal of a subset of Hanford tank waste as transuranic waste (TRU) is their preferred alternative assuming TRU classification and environmental permitting requirements are met. The Office of River Protection (ORP) is evaluating reinitiating the Contact Handled Mixed TRU (CH-TRUM) project (see Activity Report 1/28/2005) to perform this work. The original scope was for the waste in 11 SSTs to be treated at CH-TRUM. These tanks include T-111 and several other SSTs showing evidence of decreasing levels.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant.** Contractor senior management approved the root cause report and corrective actions for the event where workers were exposed to high airborne contamination while removing highly contaminated waste from a glove box (see Activity report 2/8/13, 1/25/13). The contractor completed interim corrective actions including focused training and requiring immediate responders to have a respirator available. Remaining corrective actions include installing an airlock-like tent for workers exiting the room that contains this glovebox as well as modifying and reinforcing training for both workers and supervisors.

**100K Area.** The contractor identified that they had another problem with configuration management of the safety basis for the 100K West Basin again (see Activity Report 4/13/12). The contractor is nearing completion of the final corrective action which they believe will prevent recurrence.

**Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF).** The site reps did a walkdown of WSCF, a less than HC-3 facility that performs waste and environmental sampling for the site. They visited some of the laboratory spaces and discussed recent issues involving the ventilation system and maintenance with the facility representative and contractor personnel.