

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 22, 2013

TO: S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending February 22, 2013

DNFSB Chairman P. Winokur and Acting Technical Director S. Stokes were onsite to accompany US Senator Wyden during his visit to the site on Tuesday. They separately met with DOE and contractor personnel on Wednesday to discuss open commitments to Board Recommendations 2000-1, 2004-2, 2010-2, and 2012-2. They performed walkdowns of the 100 KW Basin Annex construction site, the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility, the AN Tank Farm, and the 222-S Laboratory.

Tank Farms. The Office of River Protection (ORP) announced that the waste level in single-shell tank (SST) T-111 is decreasing. This tank was constructed in 1944 and first declared an assumed leaker in 1979. The tank was interim stabilized in 1995 to reduce free liquid content in the waste following evidence of additional leakage beginning in 1993. The contractor is currently evaluating several other SSTs with waste level data trends similar to T-111.

The contractor implemented the revised Documented Safety Analysis that begins the restoration of double-shell tank ventilation to safety-significant (see Activity Report 2/15/2013).

Retrieval from SST C-101 to double-shell tank AN-101 resumed this week.

Sludge Treatment Project. The contractor is evaluating if they can downgrade most of the planned safety-significant structures, systems, and components to general service.

Plutonium Finishing Plant. The contractor identified a problem with the implementation of the Specific Administrative Control (SAC) for combustible loading after discovering combustible materials stored too close to a door. The Board's staff had identified similar problems in the past (see Activity Report 6/10/11). Workers involved with placing the material close to the door reported that there was a "Combustible Storage" sign on the door to the room and noted some combustible storage areas allow storage within 10 feet of the door. Corrective actions by the contractor were appropriate and included: entry into the associated Limiting Condition for Operation, terminating work activities, completing an extent of condition walkdown, and increasing attention to combustible control requirements by creating a roving "combustible controls watch" that will ensure housekeeping and combustible controls are maintained throughout the day. Last week, the combustible loading control was upgraded from an administrative control to a SAC as part of the annual Documented Safety Analysis update (see Activity Report 2/19/2013).

Waste Treatment Plant. ORP completed a surveillance of portions of the contractor's procurement activities for the emergency turbine generators (ETG). ORP identified five preliminary findings and came to the overall conclusion that based on the current commercial grade dedication plan, the acceptability of engineering services for the ETG is indeterminate.

Richland Operations Office. D. Thrasher completed his initial qualifications as a facility representative at the Plutonium Finishing Plant.