

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending January 4, 2013

Continued Safe Operability Oversight Team (CSOOT): In February 2012, NNSA provided guidance to the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project team that transition of enriched uranium operations from Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 to UPF would be deferred (see 2/17/12 report). Though NNSA has not specified a date when these capabilities would transition to UPF, B&W has assumed for planning purposes that enriched uranium operations in Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 could continue until at least 2030. Using this assumption, NPO, B&W, and NNSA headquarters personnel performed a reevaluation of the 2007 Facility Risk Review (FRR) for Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 in March 2012. The FRR team recommended several actions for ensuring continued safe operations in these facilities through 2030 (see 5/18/12 and 7/13/12 reports). Two notable recommendations called for (1) a process to periodically report to NNSA headquarters the progress of efforts to address previous FRR recommendations concerning Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 and (2) an evaluation of the base assumptions used for the Buildings 9204-2E and 9215 FRR as the UPF project schedule for transition of these capabilities continues to evolve.

In 2007, YSO and B&W established a CSOOT to help ensure continued safe operations of the Building 9212 complex. In a December 20, 2012, letter to NPO, B&W transmitted a new CSOOT charter that expands the team's responsibility to include Buildings 9204-2E and 9215. The decision to include the two new facilities was influenced by (1) the delay in transitioning the 9204-2E and 9215 mission to UPF until possibly 2030, (2) the recommendations from the most recent FRR and (3) recognition of the importance of independent oversight by line management. The charter describes how the CSOOT will use a set of performance indicators to trend and analyze the overall health of the facilities. The indicators include the availability and performance of key structures, systems, and components; maintenance backlogs; and other nuclear safety conditions. The CSOOT will also consider the results from other assessments such as structural and vital safety system walkdowns. The CSOOT will brief B&W and NPO senior management quarterly and will document findings for all three facilities in its annual reports. These annual reports will also be briefed to the Board to fulfill the reporting requirement from the Board's March 13, 2007, letter to NNSA that advocated increased vigilance and regular assessment of the physical condition of the Building 9212 complex.

Criticality Safety: B&W nuclear criticality safety personnel use the criticality control review (CCR) process to determine which criticality safety controls require incorporation into the applicable technical safety requirements (TSRs). In August 2011, NPO approved a revision to the criteria used in the CCR process (see 9/30/11 report). This revision is intended to reduce the number of passive design features that are required to be incorporated into the TSRs. To date, the revised criteria have been fully applied to five processes in Building 9212. In October 2012, NPO requested an implementation plan describing when the new CCR process would be applied to the remainder of the fissile material processes at Y-12. B&W recently responded to this request by stating that the new criteria will be implemented when a valid business case exists. The response states that this will likely occur as criticality safety documentation is changed through initiatives such as the Criticality Safety Evaluation Upgrade Plan. Funding for these changes is not currently available, but B&W plans to present the business case for making these changes to the appropriate program managers for inclusion in the fiscal year 2014 budget.