

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 21, 2012

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: D. Gutowski and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending December 21, 2012

Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC). Workers from the mission support contractor (MSC) failed to follow their work document and notify the SWOC facility managers before isolating a backup fire protection water supply pump. Although the managers at the SWOC facilities knew that the water would be isolated and had completed the appropriate actions (e.g. stopping all waste handling and hotwork activities), they had not entered the associated limiting condition for operation (LCO). The failure of MSC workers to follow their procedures which require them to notify the managers of nuclear facilities is a recurring problem. The site rep also noted that the completion of monthly MSC test procedures should also require entry into this LCO for SWOC. The SWOC contractor will evaluate if the safety basis needs to be modified.

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF): A worker performing routine facility rounds unknowingly passed through a boundary that other workers had established for hazardous electrical energy control. These other workers were performing a surveillance while standing on the catwalk over the WESF pool. During the pre-job briefing, the work team determined that the entire pool area would be restricted because there was a remote chance that the long-handled tool could contact overhead electrical busbars and endanger anyone in the area. This expanded restriction is a change from previous performances of this activity. The workers performing the surveillance hung their authorized worker locks on the isolation breaker but failed to properly post the boundary. The contractor will investigate if contacting the busbars with the tool is plausible, but in the meantime will likely use their traditional boundary for the work and only post a boundary around the catwalk.

Tank Farms. The Tank Farms lost power last Saturday night due to an electrical fire on a utility pole in the 200 East Area. The power loss did not impact the 242-A Evaporator which has a separate feed, but it caused a loss of primary ventilation in the Double-Shell Tanks (DSTs) in both the 200 East and 200 West Areas. All ventilation systems were restarted by midweek.

The contractor discovered liquid exceeding the 16 inch limit in the leak detection pit for DST AY-102. Sampling results indicate that the material is not tank waste and is not suggestive of a secondary liner leak.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP). The site rep observed a meeting of the WTP contractor's Performance Improvement Review Board. The Review Board appears close to being overwhelmed by new issues, outstanding corrective actions, and effectiveness reviews. They discussed this problem and acknowledged a need to develop a solution.

The contractor's startup organization continued system testing of the fire detection and alarm system in the Building 87 switchgear facility. The construction organization turned over this system to the startup organization last month. This is the first system turnover in several years.

F. Hidden passed his final oral board and completed his initial qualification as an ORP facility representative.