

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 7, 2012

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending December 7, 2012

235-F: DOE-SR approved the SRNS *Basis for Interim Operations for Building 235-F Surveillance and Maintenance* and associated Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). This approval was documented in the implementation plan for Recommendation 2012-1, *Savannah River Site (SRS) Building 235-F Safety* as a near term action.

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): During the evening of December 4, DWPF personnel responded to a voltage to ground alarm for the lower electrodes in the melter that was followed by a smoke alarm on the second level of the DWPF Processing Building. At the same time, fire department personnel were dispatched in response to the smoke alarm. Operations personnel found the transformer for the melter's lower electrodes on fire with the fire resembling a "fire place." They correctly secured electrical power to the top and bottom electrodes, and Fire Department personnel extinguished the fire. SRR personnel were able to replace the damaged transformer and switch within 6 hours. During this period, they were able to maintain the temperature of the melter by reenergizing the upper electrodes and operating the bubblers.

The site rep met with the contractor and DOE to discuss SRR's proposed corrective actions resulting from a recent diesel generator test (see last week's report). SRR is planning on reviewing how they make public address announcements, add additional information to the procedures, and troubleshoot the local control station.

Facility Observations: The site rep observed operator rounds and reviewed control room permits, tracking logs, etc. at K-Area. Minor issues with tags and out-of-range equipment were discussed and resolved with the operations staff. The site reps also requested information about the maintenance backlog. The site rep also observed pre-job briefings for cask unloading in L-Area and observed operation of the shielded transfer system.

The site rep observed examples of the numerous sprinkler head deficiencies previously identified by SRNS personnel in SRNL. While many of the deficiencies were minor in nature (e.g., misplacement by a few inches) several of the deficiencies were obvious and should have been identified previously. In general, however, SRNL did a sound job of identifying problems and is working to correct them.

Facility Representative (FR) Program: DOE-SR completed their triennial self-assessment of their FR program and identified seven findings. The team gave a marginal rating for the objective "performance assessment and feedback program in place." The related finding was that DOE-SR did not adequately address issues from previous program reviews and that some deficiencies remain unresolved due to incomplete, ineffective, or the lack of corrective actions. Other findings addressed the lack of an approved facility-specific qualification standard for one organization, some required assessments not being performed in accordance with the annual assessment plan, and the lack of a FR program manager.

Tank Farms: The 254-13H standby diesel generator provides power to a safety significant process vessel ventilation (PVV) system for the H-Tank Farm. Last week while load testing this diesel generator, tank farm personnel encountered both personnel errors and equipment problems (see last week's report). SRR personnel connected a portable diesel generator to the PVV system and completed the near term corrective actions to have a temporary system in place. They are working through the longer term corrective actions which could take up to 60 days to complete.