

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

**MEMO TO:** Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Tom Spatz, Pantex Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending December 14, 2012

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** M. Sautman was at Pantex to support site representative activities.

**Enhanced Transportation Cart II (ETC II):** This week, the site representative identified an unattended ETC II in a ramp with the bright red “full” indicator displayed on its exterior. This red knob is used as one indication that an ETC II contains a nuclear explosive or nuclear material. B&W Pantex uses the Move Right software application to control material moves within the Pantex Plant. The Operations Center monitors the Move Right application and at no time was nuclear material left in an unattended ETC II. The site representative immediately notified the NPO Deputy Assistant Manager for Operations Management and stayed with the ETC II until B&W Pantex personnel responded. The personnel opened the ETC II, verified that the cart did not contain a nuclear explosive, and then placed the proper indicator on the cart showing that it was empty. The contractor is still investigating what procedural breakdown led to the wrong indicator being on the cart and why this error was not detected sooner. Preliminary information indicates that a Do Not Use tag was attached to this cart in late November and that this ETC II had been sitting in the ramp with the full indicator displayed for approximately two weeks.

**Fire Penetration Seals:** During the last four months, B&W Pantex has developed three Justifications for Continued Operation (JCOs) which identify compensatory measures for suspect fire penetration seals in various bays and cells across the Pantex plant. (See reports for 8/24/12 and 12/7/12.) The latest JCO, submitted to the NNSA Production Office (NPO) this week, expands the scope to include 20 additional facilities. While the compensatory actions in the three JCOs are similar, there are differences in the specific controls. B&W Pantex has issued a series of standing orders for operations personnel to implement the many compensatory actions in these and other active JCOs. The site representative met with B&W production managers and NPO facility representatives to discuss how the contractor is communicating these compensatory measures to the production technicians because of the potential for confusion.

**Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) Change Evaluation:** This week, a B&W NES reviewer identified conflicting procedures related to on-site transportation of one particular weapon program. The B&W NES reviewer was performing a contractor NES change evaluation of the procedure P7-2004, *Lightning Protection Controls*. Although the approved NES study for this weapon program requires a clear-weather window for on-site transportation, the reviewer found that the P7-2004 procedure did not contain this requirement. The NES study report, approved in 2010, for this weapon program contained a post-start finding concerning a threat to the weapon from lightning during on-site transportation. The NES study group determined this finding was a post-start finding because there was a procedure in place that required a clear-weather window, P7-5638-1, *General Safety Requirements for Handling & Transporting Nuclear Explosives, Nuclear Material, & [Nuclear Explosive Like Assemblies] NELAs (U)*. B&W checked all records to verify that no weapon moves have been conducted during lightning warnings since the 2010 NES study. B&W will revise P7-2004 to include a clear-weather window requirement for this weapon program.