

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 12, 2012

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R.T. Davis and R.K. Verhaagen  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Report for Week Ending October 12, 2012

**Area G 3706 Campaign:** In FY 2012, LANL removed 920 m<sup>3</sup> of the highest risk above ground solid transuranic (TRU) waste from TA-54, Area G, under the first year of the 3706 campaign. This inventory included 23,075 PE-Ci of TRU waste and exceeded the performance goals of 800 m<sup>3</sup> and 22,500 PE-Ci. The FY 13 performance goals are to remove a campaign cumulative volume of 2600 m<sup>3</sup> and a campaign cumulative 33,739 PE-Ci. Achieving these goals will keep the project on pace to meet the framework agreement commitment to remove the 3706 m<sup>3</sup> of above ground TRU waste by June 30, 2014.

In order to achieve the FY 2013 performance goals, the box lines in domes 375 and 231, and the drum venting system (DVS) in dome 33 will have to be fully operational. Fire suppression system upgrades and a federal readiness assessment (FRA) are required prior to commencing operations in dome 375. Fire suppression system upgrades, ventilation system commissioning, and a contractor readiness assessment are required prior to commencing box line operations in dome 231. Corrective actions from the DVS FRA (see 10/5/12 weekly) will have to be identified and closed prior to commencing Hazard Category 2/3 DVS operations in dome 33.

**Work Planning and Control:** LANL continues to experience problems with work planning and work control as noted in last week's report. For example:

At a radiochemistry laboratory, a known previously contaminated cask located outside of the building was intentionally opened with a forklift without a specific integrated work document or radiological work permit in place. The work was done in the open air outside of a controlled area because it was believed that the cask was clean based on one individual's recollection from nearly 20 years ago. The lid was replaced when the radiological control technician detected the presence of contamination inside the opened cask.

At an environmental, safety and health analytical laboratory, workers removing ducting from a furnace were exposed to ash containing perchlorate and nitric acid. The development of the work scope for this job did not identify these contaminants as a potential hazard, and as such no controls (i.e. respirator protection) for this hazard were employed.

The Associate Director for Nuclear and High Hazard Operations has recognized this trend of poor performance in planning and controlling work, and is emphasizing this as a focus area with his facility operation directors.

**Criticality Safety Improvement Plan:** On September 28, 2012, LANS submitted a revised, *Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Improvement Plan*, to the site office for review and approval. This is the sixth revision to the document since it was issued in March, 2006. This most recent revision updates the status of program implementation at important facilities and updates progress on planned nuclear criticality safety evaluations.