

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 3, 2012

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending August 3, 2012

Rich Tontodonato was on site this week.

H-Canyon: The contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) for Phase I of the used nuclear fuel campaign resulted in pre-start actions related to the project training plan, a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis dealing with a sump alarm, a procedure weakness, and some minor procedure compliance issues. SRNS closed these actions and DOE commenced their RA this week. During the original spent fuel RA (see 10/1/10 report), operators did not implement a transient combustible specific administrative control (SAC) satisfactorily so the site rep requested that this RA's scope include a demonstration of this SAC's implementation. While the operators ensured that the transient combustibles around the fuel cask and railroad tunnel airlock support beams were well within limits, the operators were very confused about what constituted a previously analyzed fixed combustible vice a transient combustible. Not only did this result in inconsistent and arbitrary implementation of the SAC (albeit in the conservative direction), but they also initially ignored combustibles in front of the support beams and skipped a waste container from their combustible loading estimates. Many of these problems were caused by the lack of procedure guidance and training provided to the operators and first line manager implementing this SAC. H-Canyon operations personnel will provide additional training and procedure guidance to address the observed weaknesses. During the sampling dry run, the RA team identified two occasions where the operators performed the intended action, but this did not match the procedure step because the procedure step could not be implemented as written. Furthermore, the crane operator was unable to insert the dummy fuel bundle into the dissolver mockup because another dummy fuel bundle was already in the desired well. The crane operator quickly identified the problem and the facility responded appropriately. A previous crane operator had left the dummy fuel bundle in the dissolver mockup during an earlier practice session, but shift turnover of this was inadequate.

Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF): SWMF personnel are repackaging high dose rate TRU waste in cell 11 (see 7/13-7/27/12 reports). This week, SRNS personnel attempted to repackage the first of these casks when an alert radiological control inspector noticed that the cask was labeled as having beryllium. Working on casks containing Be in cell 11 is prohibited by site procedures. The site took the correct actions to determine the contents of this cask and to begin work on a cask that complies with site procedures.

Recommendation 2012-1 Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety: The staff attended a briefing by DOE and SRNS personnel on the draft implementation plan for Recommendation 2012-1. As reported last week, it now appears that these actions will include some removal of the material at risk although the exact end points for both safety and environmental purposes have not yet been determined. The Board's staff will continue to provide feedback as DOE and SRNS personnel develop their implementation plan.