

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 16, 2012

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending March 16, 2012

Quality Assurance: The SRNS Facility Evaluation Board (FEB) conducted a review of Quality Services (QS). The quality assurance program is a safety program to help ensure the safety of the public, the worker, and the environment. Within SRNS, QS manages the corporate Quality Assurance Program and as a part of that program, provides Supplier Quality Assurance. The site has recently completed the transition to the 2008 revision/2009 addendum of ASME NQA-1 *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications*. However, they have delayed updating the requirements for commercial grade dedication of common parts in stores, such as fuses, bolts, nuts, and washers until those items are depleted or the specifications are revised for other reasons. During this review the FEB found that many of these common non-complex parts did not have the appropriate documentation of the critical characteristics for acceptance. The site rep believes that this comment implies that parts procured using this documentation may not meet the requirements for parts important to safety. SRNS committed to clarify this assessment finding to the staff.

E-Area: Workers at Cell 11 remediate transuranic waste so that it can be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). In order to do this safely, the site added a nitrogen-activated, water-based fire suppression system. After contractor personnel completed the required preventative maintenance over the weekend, an operator found a slow leak of nitrogen from the system on Monday morning. The operator made the appropriate notifications, but soon thereafter the system activated releasing several gallons of water into the facility and covering the area with a fine mist of water. No waste containers were in the facility and no damage from the water was observed.

While preparing a box for shipment to WIPP, a worker discovered that a filter which should have been installed in March was not installed. The procedure to install this filter was completed and the attachment was signed off by an operator and the supervisor. The procedure was overly complex and could be significantly simplified to ensure that the filters are installed before the attachment is signed.

Tank Farms: SRR declared an ORPS reportable event for contamination (80,000 dpm β/γ) that was discovered on the cable of equipment shipped to the on-site calibration laboratory. The tank farms radiological control personnel retrieved the equipment from the calibration facility.

The site rep attended a Facility Radiological Action Team (FRAT) review of the procedures Tank Farms intends to use to cut the bottom of the telescoping transfer pump (TTP) in Tank 30. (See 2/2 and 2/24/2012 reports.) The team was not fully prepared to conduct the review; the procedures were not fully thought through and lacked the specificity and needed to proceed with draining the waste from the pump. The facility manager agreed that better radiological planning was needed.