

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 17, 2012

**TO:** T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman, and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending February 17, 2012

**Solid Waste Management Facility:** The Container Management Plan does not allow vented overpacks containing > 130 Pu-239 equivalent curies to be stacked. SRNS implements this control by placing a black letter label with a white background on the top and one side of a white standard waste box (SWB) that also contains other information written in black letters. While many of these “Do Not Stack” SWBs are segregated on Pad 6, some of them are intermixed with SWBs that are stacked up to 3 high. When SWBs need to be repositioned to locate a specific SWB, the pre-job briefing and work package only highlight the requirements of the targeted SWBs, and ignore any information about the SWBs that may need to be moved to access the targeted one. Last week, a forklift driver did not notice the “Do Not Stack” label on a SWB and stacked it on top of another SWB in order to access other SWBs that were stacked next to it. The site rep encouraged the contractor to use more conspicuous means (e.g., colors, flags, cones) to differentiate the SWBs subject to stacking limitations. Furthermore, if they cannot fully segregate the “Do Not Stack” SWBs then these need to be highlighted before the job begins and more rigor is needed when workers perform the 10 “if-then” statements that implement various nuclear, criticality, fire, and packaging safety requirements related to container storage.

A forklift driver raised a ~2000-lb jersey barrier by lifting the jersey barrier’s connecting ring with a forklift tine while a rigger inserted cribbing under the partially buried jersey barrier. When the ring slipped off the tine, the jersey barrier dropped 8 inches, impacting the rigger’s hand which was underneath the cribbing at the time and breaking his finger. SRNS is making sure that anyone who inserts items or uses remote tools under suspended loads appreciates the potential hazard to hands, which may not be directly under the load.

**Plutonium Disposition:** As part of an alternatives study, NNSA is considering using H-Canyon and HB-Line to augment plutonium oxide production by receiving and processing pit material. SRNS will be preparing an impacts study for this potential scope of work. This data will be used in the development of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement.

**Saltstone:** DOE told SRR that they expect the planned high capacity campaigns will demonstrate the reliability of the overall Saltstone Facility and not just the systems modified during the Enhanced Low Activity Waste Disposition outage.

**Tritium:** Oxygen monitors are installed in tritium glove boxes to ensure that any leaks into the glove box are detected and thus preclude the possibility of a combustible atmosphere within the glove box. The current monitors fail on a fairly regular basis and require replacement. SRNS has identified a more robust alternative design, but this new design is still under review. In the meantime, SRS needs to maintain a sufficient number of spare monitors of the current design to replace any failed units. However, the site’s inventory has dwindled down to only one oxygen monitor and procurement of additional units has been delayed due to a number of issues (e.g., change of ownership of supplier, implementation issues with new site procurement software).