

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Wayne Andrews and David Kupferer, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending February 10, 2012

Staff member David Campbell visited Y-12 this week to augment site representative coverage and assess B&W's progress in executing its Conduct of Operations Performance Improvement Plan (see the 10/28/11 report).

Conduct of Operations. This week, B&W issued a report on its independent assessment of actions associated with its Conduct of Operations Performance Improvement Plan (see the 1/20/12 report). Overall, the assessment team's report concludes that the actions taken to date have had a noticeable positive impact on conduct of operations and that continued management focus will likely result in substantial future improvements. In particular, the assessment team highlighted improvements associated with implementation of new place keeping requirements and the Senior Supervisor Watch (SSW) program. The assessment team identified several recommendations including the following: (a) expanding the audience for the recently implemented, practical conduct of operations training course should be expanded from production personnel to include all personnel that contribute to effective conduct of operations (see the 10/28/11 report) and (b) strengthening the procedure modification request process (see the 7/16/10 report).

Maintenance/Work Planning/Conduct of Operations. Last week, B&W completed a laudable independent investigation of the small fire that occurred while replacing the engine coolant heater of a safety-significant diesel generator for the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (see the 12/23/11 report). The investigation team identified that maintenance, production, and engineering personnel violated several site requirements during this event including (a) conducting work on electrical equipment without verifying absence of voltage and without performing a lockout/tagout and (b) failing to suspend work and make proper notifications (e.g., calling the fire department) immediately after the fire occurred. The investigation team's report also highlighted the following as contributors to this event: (a) the work package (there was a discrepancy regarding what type of lockout/tagout was to be performed), (b) the pre-job briefing (the lockout/tagout was not discussed), (c) communications between personnel (particularly between the lockout/tagout issuing authority and the electricians), and (d) labeling associated with the circuit panel. The investigation team made the following recommendations to B&W senior management: (a) perform a review of sitewide procedures and training associated with hazardous energy control, (b) identify lessons learned associated with suspending work and making proper notifications in response to abnormal events, and (c) perform an extent of condition evaluation on equipment labeling.

This week, B&W provided YSO with near-term corrective actions, both completed and planned, for addressing identified Lockout/Tagout and Hazardous Energy Control issues (see 2/3/12 report). To date, B&W has completed six actions including (a) issuance of a standing order that requires the LO/TO form be approved and included in the work package prior to authorizing work, (b) revising sitewide requirements to require additional management oversight of maintenance activities, and (c) establishing a multidisciplinary, senior management team tasked with comprehensively addressing sitewide hazardous energy issues. Planned near-term actions include (a) conducting a formal causal analysis of the past events, (b) evaluating field implementation of LO/TO activities, and (c) developing a formal corrective action plan that identifies additional intermediate-term and long-term corrective actions.