DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 30, 2011

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending September 30, 2011

Staff Reviews: A DNFSB fire protection engineer (FPE) reviewed the fire protection water supply systems at SRNL and K-Areas and their associated backfit analyses since portions of these systems were upgraded to safety significant. In addition to a number of equipment issues, the FPE questioned the amount of combustibles stored inside the building housing the A-Area fire pumps, which is not protected by an automatic sprinkler system. A larger staff team also walked down 235-F and reviewed its draft Basis for Interim Operations. The team was concerned with the limited fire detection and lack of automatic fire suppression within 235-F in concert with the amount of combustibles remaining in 235-F. The team will brief the Board on its findings.

Emergency Preparedness (EP): SRNS conducted its first recovery tabletop drill. The scenario involved the recovery from a K-Area truck fire involving transuranic waste drums – basically "day 2" of last June's annual EP exercise scenario. In the first part, the recovery manager identified his recovery team. In the second part, the recovery team took the previously developed recovery plan outline, identified short and long-term tasks and then prioritized and assigned the tasks. The plan addressed issues like scene stabilization and preservation, resumption of facility operations, and environmental sampling. One of the main benefits of the drill was allowing the team members to better understand all of the logistics and requirements involved with a recovery. During the 2.5 hour drill, the team developed a more detailed overall plan, but did not have time to split into subteams and figure out the specifics on how they would reenter the scene, dispose of contaminated equipment, etc. In this scenario, it would have been interesting to see how they would have balanced the desire to grant accident investigators access to the preserved scene when the typical approach for working with highly contaminated spills is to spray fixative everywhere.

Saltstone: Workers removed two metal rods from the pulsation dampener. These foreign objects may have caused last week's waste spill. SRR has cleaned up the spill and replaced/repaired equipment. Processing of tank 50 waste may resume this weekend.

H-Canyon: While removing the lid off a steel waste box, a worker noticed that one of the four lifting lugs was starting to pull loose from the lid. The lid was put back on the box. During the post-job review of this event, SRNS discovered that lid lifting requirements were not clearly communicated. For example, a rigging engineer had developed several lid lifting plans for other types of waste boxes that called for the use of plates to lift the lids rather than trying to qualify the lifting lugs on the old boxes. These informal plans, however, were simply emailed to operations, not discussed with engineers, and were not reflected in the procedure. SRNS intends to make this process more formal in the future.