

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 8, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: B.P. Broderick and R.T. Davis
SUBJECT: Los Alamos Report for Week Ending April 8, 2011

Broderick was out of the office this week.

Plutonium Facility – Seismic Safety: On Tuesday, the staff held a teleconference with site office and LANL personnel to discuss the on-going seismic analysis of the Plutonium Facility structure, systems and components. This evaluation will support a path forward for the outstanding Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) associated with the updated probabilistic seismic hazards analysis and upgrade decisions in response to Recommendation 2009-2, *LANL Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety*. The seismic evaluation is scheduled to be complete in mid-May followed by review and comment from the peer review team resulting in a final product at the end of May. At that time, LANL also plans to submit an update to the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) that includes a major revision to the bounding seismic accident scenarios.

Transuranic Waste Operations: On Thursday at the WCRR Repackaging Facility, operators identified a bulging 55 gallon inner drum after de-nesting the drum from an 85 gallon overpack drum. WCRR personnel responded appropriately and followed the abnormal operating procedure that required contacting the emergency response organization. After initial evaluation, the HAZMAT response team was also requested and responded to the facility. Portable HEPA filtered ventilation was moved in proximity to the drum and a robotic system was deployed to remove the vent from the 55 gallon drum to relieve any residual pressure in the drum. The vent was replaced and the drum was subsequently repackaged in the WCRR waste characterization glovebox. Limited contamination was identified on the portable ventilation system but no other facility contamination was identified.

Plutonium Facility – Safety Basis: Last week, LANL began the Implementation Verification Review for the fifth phase of the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) associated with the DSA approved in 2008. The primary focus of this review is on implementation of controls associated with the safety class fire suppression system. These controls are scheduled to be declared implemented by April 21st.

LANL has also requested site office approval to delay overall implementation of the 2008 TSRs from April 21st to June 3rd due to delays in development and deployment of the MAR Tracker software program that will be used to complete TSR MAR surveillances. LANL notes that implementation involves 4,000 material locations, multiple software database and program interactions and several Plutonium Facility organizations. Currently, a number of issues have been identified as a part of the software Validation and Verification process that require resolution prior to declaring TSR implementation.

Material Disposal Area-B (MDA-B): Based on a review of the MDA-B Facility Safety Plan in February, the site office requested that LANL revisit the institutional procedures and processes on facility chemical hazard categorization. The LANL response notes that the public and collocated worker protection criteria from DOE Standard 1189 will be used for future chemical hazard classification purposes. The revised methodology will be issued in a safety basis bulletin within 10 days of site office concurrence.