

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 4, 2011

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending March 4, 2011

Mr. Sautman was on travel this week.

Solid Waste Management: SRNS has resumed shipping depleted uranium oxide for disposal. This week they shipped 288 drums to the Nevada National Security Site.

H-Canyon: In one of the pipe runs outside, condensate was leaking from a contamination area (CA) into a clean area below. This pipe run also included an Enriched Uranium Storage transfer line. As part of this leak investigation, radiological protection department (RPD) personnel surveyed nearby equipment and found contamination on a deionized water pipe. Removable contamination levels were as high as 2,000 dpm/100cm² alpha and 2,000 dpm/100cm² beta-gamma while fixed contamination probed 12,000 dpm alpha and 10,000 dpm beta-gamma. In response, operators isolated the leak and RPD personnel posted the leak site as a high contamination/airborne radioactivity area and the surrounding area as a CA. Afterwards, a personnel contamination monitor detected contamination on the clothing of one of the RPD inspectors. Surveys showed 600 dpm alpha and no beta-gamma on the sole of both shoes, and 2,000 dpm alpha and no beta-gamma on the back pocket of her modesty clothing. Inclement weather conditions delayed further confirmatory surveys.

Saltstone: SRR personnel completed maintenance on the system by removing compacted material from the screw feeder slide gates and they should be ready to have a processing run next week. Currently SRR has more feed in tank 50 than can be held in vault 4 without getting approval to use the reserved cells B and H. SRR is currently completing actions to allow Vault 2, Cell A to receive grout. These actions should provide relief in the near future.

Site Procedure Development: SRNS attempted to process a change to the procedure for processing unreviewed safety questions. The change was primarily aimed at incorporating an agreed upon definition for defense-in-depth/important-to-safety and degraded equipment. However, at the last minute SRNS included a change that would have applied only to SRNS and which, they had not adequately vetted through other personnel at SRNS or SRR. SRR objected and the procedure was appropriately tabled until it could be adequately reviewed. DOE has a commitment to have this procedure in place by March 15th.