

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 15, 2008

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending February 15, 2008

Staff members D. Ogg, D. Grover, and M. Dunlevy were on-site reviewing the K Basins Sludge Treatment Project, the Large Package and Remote Handled Waste Handling Facility Project, and the preparations for the restart of K Basins Spent Nuclear Fuel processing systems.

Tank Farms: The site rep observed the kickoff meeting for the Interim Pretreatment Facility Integrated Project Team (IPT). The draft IPT charter notes that the Safety Design Integration Team will be responsible for the preliminary hazard analysis, conceptual design safety report, and other safety-related tasks. The draft charter identified the primary members for the pre-conceptual activities with the exception of the person responsible for the safety basis authorization and ensuring safety is addressed early in the design, but the federal project director told the site rep that filling this position is a priority.

The retrieval of the soil contaminated by the spill of tank waste at S-102 commenced on Friday after personal protective equipment issues were resolved earlier in the week.

Waste Treatment Plant: The oversight team for the Broad Based Review (BBR) (see Hanford Activity Report 1/18/08) determined that the BBR plan is logical and well structured. The BBR is a corrective action for the black cell piping issue. Team members are verifying that upper tier requirements are adequately flowed down to the design, procurements, and construction. The oversight team suggested some improvements, including frequent sharing of lessons learned between the nine BBR subteams, the addition of a process step to flag unclear requirements for further resolution by Engineering, and documenting the methods used for selecting the detailed review sample sets. The oversight team plans to continue their monthly on-site reviews.

Canister Storage Building (CSB): The site rep met with RL and contractor personnel to discuss a new activity involving found fuel containers at the CSB (see Hanford Activity Report 2/1/08). The contractor submitted revisions to the safety basis for the CSB and the Interim Storage Area (ISA), and designed the new containers. Within a few months, the K Basins Closure project will stop accepting spent nuclear fuel found during field remediation and storing the found fuel containers at the ISA is the disposition path for fuel found in the future. The current startup notification report indicated the management assessment for this activity would start this month, but the contractor explained that the actual assessment to ensure readiness would start in August and would be followed by a startup in the Fall.

Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC): A criticality nonconformance was discovered after the facility representative questioned current practices. The Criticality Safety Evaluation Report credits preventing heavy equipment from driving over buried waste drums, but there were no actual controls in the implementing documents. Sufficient contingencies remain that make criticality incredible. As an interim control the project issued a standing order that restricts vehicle movement in certain burial grounds without authorization from the operations manager.