

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 24, 2006

**TO:** K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for the Week Ending February 24, 2006

DNFSB Staff Activity: Staff members D. Burnfield, J. Troan, and outside expert D. Volgenau were on-site reviewing work planning and control process at the tank farms.

K Basins Closure Project: A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) violation was identified at K-West Basin when it was discovered that a truck used in an evolution on 2/9/2006 did not have current calibration of its speed control. The calibration for speed control had expired on 1/7/2006. The error was self-identified this week when the expired calibration was noted during preparations for an upcoming evolution. The truck was immediately tested and was within the required specifications. The operating procedure had the TSR highlighted in the caution section and indicated the date of the last calibration. During the critique, the workers expressed that the procedure was confusing because it provided a list of pre-approved trucks and that the TSR was not addressed in the pre-job brief.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): During a movement of fissile materials, the mass limit in a storage area was exceeded resulting in a criticality non-conformance. The event occurred because there were errors in the inventory spreadsheet maintained by the storage area custodian. The errors were created when new items were added but not included in the summing function to produce the total fissile mass. The operator conducting the move used the spreadsheet to check the mass in each container in the area but did not independently add up the total mass until after the move. The spreadsheet was not validated in accordance with controlled software management procedure and is solely maintained by the custodian. PFP management is creating a Shift Operating Instruction to provide immediate corrective actions and is considering the use of independent verification of spreadsheet data.

Tank Farm: A valve in a transfer line valve pit was found out of position during Tank S-112 retrieval activities. The valve line-up had been checked numerous times but operators failed to find the problem because the position indicator had been changed and was no longer giving clear indication of position. The incorrect position was found when an operator decided to physically check the valve position.

It has been announced that Dennis Ferrera will be the new CH2M Hill Hanford Group Chief Operating Officer.

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP): The site rep was briefed by the Office of River Protection on the use Human Performance Improvement methods as an investigative tool to identify areas of weakness that were not previously noted during root cause analysis.