

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Matthew Duncan and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending April 2, 2010

Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) Control Enhancement: Prior to entering operational facilities with static dissipative flooring, all personnel must pass a minimum electrical continuity requirement (specifically, the foot to hand continuity) using a footwear checker. Since its inception, this process has been controlled administratively—B&W relies on postings and training to ensure that all personnel pass the minimum electrical continuity requirement before entering an ESD program area. During the last year, B&W has been considering ways to control this process in an engineered manner by interlocking the footwear checker with some component of the facility access process. The first prototype of this engineered approach interlocks the Argus system with the footwear checker. Personnel will have to pass the footwear checker in order to lower a plate covering the badge reader, at which time they can complete the access process and enter the facility. B&W plans to install this prototype in one facility by the end of April. If this prototype presents security-related complications, B&W will continue to analyze other ways to interlock the footwear checker with the access process for facilities with static dissipative flooring.

Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) Improvement Initiative: This week, B&W issued the third revision of the DSA Improvement Initiative, an effort aimed at reducing the number of technical safety requirement (TSR) violations at Pantex (see 3/27/09 and 8/7/09 reports). The four focus areas from the first issue of the initiative remain the same, but the latest version contains several additions and modifications to the actions within some of the focus areas. Of note, B&W modified the completion date of the action associated with the administrative control (AC) reclassification effort to reflect its deferral to the second quarter of FY11 (see 3/19/10 report). For the remainder of FY10, B&W is redirecting the resources that would have been applied to the AC reclassification effort toward creating a basis document to expand and clarify the applicability of current ACs developed in the Sitewide, Transportation, Staging, Nuclear Material, and all satellite facility safety analysis reports. This basis document would aid safety basis analysts in performing unreviewed safety question determinations, and will provide a solid foundation for the AC reclassification effort when it resumes in FY11.

W87 Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) Change Evaluation: A W87 recently failed an electrical test that indicated a short within the weapon electrical system. Technicians suspended the operation. Further electrical testing will be required to isolate the problem. The design agency wrote in a special instruction engineering release that there are no safety concerns because the environmental sensing device and the mechanical safe and arm detonator have been verified to be in the safe position. DOE O 452.2D, *Nuclear Explosive Safety*, prohibits redundant electrical tests or electrical troubleshooting unless the procedures and test equipment have been subjected to a NES evaluation for the specific application. Therefore, this week a NES change evaluation group evaluated the proposed operations and determined that they would not pose a threat to NES. The group did not identify any findings and there were no deliberation topics.