

## **DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**MEMO TO:** Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Matthew Duncan and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending July 30, 2010

**Flooding Event:** Representatives from the design agencies were onsite to understand the process B&W has been using to resume operations following the flooding event of July 8. B&W management presented documented evidence that the appropriate engineering disciplines evaluated and resolved any issues associated with the safety systems, tooling, testers, and nuclear or nuclear explosive configurations. Following a walkdown of select nuclear explosive facilities, the DA representatives, with some minor exceptions, informally indicated they were satisfied with the measures that B&W had taken prior to resuming operations.

B&W has resumed operations in most nuclear and nuclear explosive facilities that contained standing water in the operating area following the flooding event. Operations in the mass properties and vacuum chamber and manifold facilities cannot resume until the authorization basis department submits (and PXSO approves) an evaluation of the safety of the situation (ESS) that describes technical safety requirement-level compensatory measures needed for the newly analyzed performance category-3 flood event. PXSO expects to approve the ESS next week.

**Violation of a Specific Administrative Control (SAC):** The Pantex documented safety analysis credits several SACs to reduce the likelihood of vehicle impact events during the loading or unloading of nuclear explosives or nuclear explosive-like assemblies from Zone 4 magazines. One of these SACs requires road closure at the ends of the appropriate Zone 4 magazine access road prior to opening the magazine or transport trailer. A separate SAC prohibits anyone from driving on the roads that have been closed. There is an exception for security vehicles, which may travel on the unpaved areas on either side of the closed road.

This week, while a magazine's doors were open, a security police officer (SPO) drove nearby to check on other SPOs and ask whether they needed a break. In doing so, he drove on the closed road at least two times, which violated the SAC. As this SAC is now covered by the generic limiting condition of operation, the event was not a technical safety requirement violation, like it was when a similar event occurred November 12, 2008 (see 11/14/08 report). In that event, the SPO bypassed a closure sign that he thought was not valid. In this case, the SPO never saw the signs because he was driving through open roads and unpaved areas between magazines. However, the SPO had been trained on the SAC, should have communicated via radio to ascertain the status of operations, and should have observed the lights on vehicles that indicated operations were in progress and the road had been closed. B&W held a critique for the event and will perform a casual analysis next week.

**W84 Contractor Readiness Assessment (RA):** B&W recently completed its RA to assess preparations for W84 disassembly and inspection operations using the new SS-21 process. There were 3 pre-start findings, 1 post-start finding, and 3 observations. One pre-start finding addressed 15 procedure issues, 4 of which prevented technicians from performing a step as written. All pre-start findings have since been closed and the post-start finding has an approved corrective action plan in place. The NNSA RA is scheduled to begin next week.