

## **DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**MEMO TO:** Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Matthew Duncan and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending August 6, 2010

**DNFSB Activity:** C. Martin was onsite to observe the first week of the W84 SS-21 readiness assessment.

**Flooding Event:** B&W has resumed operations in all nuclear and nuclear explosive facilities affected by the flooding event of July 8. Generally, the final facilities and operations to be restarted were either awaiting completion of more extensive tooling evaluations or PXSO approval of the latest revision to the evaluation of the situation. Facilities in the former group contained workstands that had been exposed to standing water during the flooding event. These workstands contained nuclear explosive configurations at levels of assembly that could not be transferred to unaffected workstands using the existing tool set. Therefore, tooling design personnel performed a detailed investigation to prove the workstands could meet applicable safety basis requirements for the remainder of their respective operations. Of specific concern was whether these workstands would maintain continuity with static dissipative flooring. Because crafts personnel cannot perform these measurements on workstands with nuclear explosive configurations, they tested the electrical continuity and functionality of a similar workstand from another location in the same block of bays. The representative workstand passed the continuity check by two orders of magnitude. In addition, process engineering developed a temporary procedure to allow the tooling design engineer to perform limited functional testing of the affected workstands. Ultimately, tooling design personnel concluded that these workstands will be fully functional and able to satisfy all credited design features.

Upon completion of the tooling evaluation and receipt of authorization to restart in one of the remaining facilities, technicians successfully executed the recovery procedure for the W80 unit that could not be disassembled using the conventional process (see 7/2/10 report).

**Violation of a Specific Administrative Control (SAC):** As reported last week, a security police officer violated a SAC when he drove on a road that had been closed to support open magazine operations in Zone 4. B&W convened a cause analysis meeting to discuss the reasons for the SAC violation. They also discussed why it took more than one hour for the violation to be reported to the appropriate personnel outside of the safeguards and security (S&S) division so that they could direct actions necessary to restore compliance with the control and to officially enter the generic limiting condition of operation (LCO). The standing order that implements the generic LCO requires that several actions be taken immediately upon the discovery that one of the applicable SACs may have been compromised. Upon its initial release, B&W limited the applicability of the standing order and excluded the S&S division. As a result, the standing order's requirements were never incorporated into S&S division orders and procedures, and the S&S personnel present at the cause analysis meeting were not familiar with them. This is the second time that both the individual that violated the SAC and his supervisor were not aware of the generic LCO and its requirements (see 4/23/10 report, severe weather program SAC) and the third time that B&W did not enter the generic LCO in a timely manner (see 5/14/10 report, crane use authorization SAC).