

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 3, 2010

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: W. Linzau and R. Quirk, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending December 3, 2010

R. Quirk was off-site this week.

Board staff members R. Kazban, R. Oberreuter, and S. Stokes were on-site reviewing the Waste Treatment Plant heat transfer calculations and discussing the project's requirements for examination of welds in piping.

Waste Receiving and Processing Facility: During an inventory of drums containing accountable materials, the custodian noted that a drum that was listed on the inventory sheet was no longer in the facility. The annotation that indicated that the drum contained accountable material was removed which led to the drum being mistakenly transported to another secure facility on-site. Facility management stopped all movement of similar drums and commenced a comprehensive inventory. The project will conduct a causal analysis to aid in formulating corrective actions.

Richland Operations Office (RL): A DOE Headquarters team conducted a review of the implementation of specific administrative controls (SACs) used by the Plateau Remediation Contractor. The team found 11 preliminary findings and five observations. One of the findings was that some of the assumptions for protecting material-at-risk limits were not safeguarded by formal controls at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). One of the observations was that RL did not validate the preparation and implementation of a SAC at PFP.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The site rep met with the contractor's nuclear safety manager to discuss corrective actions for weaknesses noted in the hazard and operability reviews (HAZOPs) (see Activity Report 10/29/10). The manager has expanded the corrective actions to cover several weaknesses in the project's hazard analysis process and nuclear safety organization. The procedure is being revised to more clearly define the process and roles and responsibilities. The knowledge, skill, and abilities of the analysts are being evaluated. Training is being implemented for the nuclear safety organization and other disciplines, such as engineering, to promote uniform understanding of how to ensure compliance with DOE Orders and Standards.

The site rep and staff met with the WTP Federal Project Director to discuss staff reviews and improving communications.

222-S Laboratory: The operations in the analytical laboratories had to be secured due to a loss of adequate exhaust ventilation. Maintenance was being conducted on a normally operating fan when the standby diesel-powered fan failed causing exhaust flow to drop below the required value. The maintenance for the normal fan was completed and the repairs to the diesel-powered fan will be completed when a replacement part is delivered. No spread of contamination has been detected and normal operations have resumed.

Adverse Weather Conditions: For the second week in a row, work activities on the Hanford site have been hampered by abnormally cold temperatures and snow mixed with freezing rain.