

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director  
FROM: Wayne Andrews, Donald Owen and David Kupferer, Site Representatives  
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending August 6, 2010

Staff members R. Arnold and F. Dozier were in Oak Ridge this week to augment site rep. coverage. Staff member D. Winters was at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center to observe the DOE Operational Readiness Review for startup of the drum venting system. Mr. Owen was out of the office this week.

**Y-12 Governance Reform and Oversight.** In April, B&W determined that adopting the Kansas City Plant (KCP) Governance model (i.e., utilizing commercial standards rather than DOE directives for non-nuclear work) is feasible for non-nuclear operations at Y-12 (see the 4/9/10 site rep. report). B&W and YSO have jointly approved a Governance Implementation Plan that describes a multi-year effort for transitioning to the new Governance model. The cornerstone of the IP is the formation of a Joint Operating Requirements Review Board (JORRB) that includes representatives of both YSO and B&W and has the following responsibilities:

- evaluate existing and proposed requirements for applicability to Y-12 operations (nuclear safety requirements defined in DOE Orders are excluded from consideration to be removed from the Y-12 contract),
- revise current Y-12 processes and procedures that go beyond DOE requirements,
- determine the appropriate disposition of external assessment findings, and
- select non-nuclear operations and processes for which commercial standards may be implemented consistent with the Governance philosophy.

The JORRB is scheduled to be fully functional next month. YSO is also planning to transition from transactional oversight to system oversight in the non-nuclear environment later this year.

**Special Material Capability Project.** During testing earlier this year, B&W discovered that a complex seal assembly in the newly constructed Special Material Capability glovebox was leaking and allowing air into the negative-pressure glovebox. Through trial and error B&W determined that the cause of the leaking seal was the glovebox flange that the seal assembly is bolted to (i.e., the flange was not within tolerance because it was welded to the glovebox after it was machined). After fixing the flange, B&W tested and verified that the seal assembly no longer leaks. According to project personnel, lessons learned from the Special Material Capability project (e.g., seal, valve, and pipe welding issues) have been communicated to the Uranium Processing Facility project.

B&W is close to completing all of the procedures for the glovebox and YSO has approved the changes to the Documented Safety Analysis for Building 9204-2E. B&W is currently planning to initiate its Readiness Assessment in October.

**Feedback and Improvement.** B&W's critique procedure previously stated that it is not necessary to convene a critique if the following conditions are met: (1) no new information is expected to be learned as a result of performing a critique, (2) the root cause of the event is known, (3) operations have resumed, and (4) corrective actions have been completed (see the 7/2/10 site rep. report). In response to site rep. inquiries, B&W has revised this procedure to remove the third and fourth criteria.