

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 3, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: J. Kent Fortenberry / Joe Sanders
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending July 3, 1998

Delay in Issuance of the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) Request for Proposal (RFP): DOE and WSRC have decided to indefinitely delay issuance of the TEF RFP for final design and construction services, which was previously scheduled for 6/30/98. This delay is attributable to uncertainty in FY99 funding. The formal requests for approval to start site preparation construction (CD-3A), scheduled for September, and approval to start final design (CD-2B) have been delayed. DOE-EH has stated that it will not issue the Record of Decision (ROD) for the TEF design and construction EIS until the Secretarial decision on the tritium production technology is made. Site preparation work cannot begin until the ROD is published. These delays may impact the proposed TEF startup date of May 2005.

Public Meeting on the Pilot Study for NRC Licensing of the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF): Representatives from DOE and NRC presented a draft work plan for the pilot study at RBOF on 6/25/98 in Aiken, SC. As noted in the weekly report of 5/22/98, this study will include two one-week reviews on 7/20-24/98 and 8/24-28/98, and should culminate in a final report due 11/20/98.

Segregated Cooling Water Diversion at F-Canyon - Cooling water supplied to systems with the potential for high activity (e.g., cooling water to canyon vessels) is normally discharged to the site streams. However, if excessive activity (>3 dpm/mL α or >10 dpm/mL β - γ) is detected by the in-line radiation monitor, the cooling water stream is diverted to the basin. Cooling water was diverted to the diversion basin on 6/25/98 due to 510 dpm/mL β - γ detected in the cooling water. Just prior to the high activity being detected, the cooling water had been valved in to four F-Canyon tanks. After detection, cooling water to these four tanks was isolated and the activity quickly dropped off. Although the contamination did not exceed permit limits for unrestricted discharge, the water in the diversion basin was treated in the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). This incident was classified as an Unusual Occurrence due to activation of a safety system. The site reps observed the critique. The contamination is probably attributable to either a "crud burst" or a very small leak in the cooling coil of one of the affected tanks. In a subsequent test, the actions leading up to the contamination event were duplicated, but no measurable activity was detected. To help identify the cause and/or prevent additional contamination, the following actions have been performed:

- level measurements on two of the tanks has been modified to allow more sensitive detection of level increases due to possible inleakage from a cooling coil leak (this action is not feasible for the other two affected tanks);
- the Segregated Cooling Water System will remain diverted when these four tanks are valved in;
- these tanks will be valved in using a staggered pattern to prevent pressure or flow surges.