

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 11, 1997

TO: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending July 11, 1997

A. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Activities: Key highlights this week include:

1. Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) Investigation Reports: The accident investigation team issued the new review draft of its report on July 3rd. The findings are significantly revised and identify PFP and DOE-RL line management deficiencies as root causes of the PRF explosion. With regard to the emergency response evaluation report, DOE-RL expects further revision as the medical response portion of the report is finalized.

2. DOE-RL Readiness Assessment (RA) at PFP: On July 8th, the DOE-RL RA team at PFP completed their review, and on July 9th, Mr. Ogg attended the close-out meeting between the RA team and PFP management. PFP failed the readiness assessment with significant weaknesses in the areas of training, procedures, corrective action management and communication of management expectations. DOE-RL, Fluor Daniel Hanford, and PFP management are negotiating corrective actions and an appropriate path forward.

B. TWRS Rotary Mode Core Sampling (RMCS): On July 8th, DOE-RL approved a contractor request to amend the RMCS authorization basis to make the flammable gas controls consistent with existing TWRS controls. (This was described during the Board's Hanford visit on June 4th.) Field crew training and confirmation of readiness should complete within one to two weeks. This should permit DOE to obtain core samples from the ten remaining high priority tanks identified in the Recommendation 93-5 implementation plan.

C. Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) Activities: BHI progress on key projects includes:

1. 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility: BHI continues to work to resolve DOE-RL comments on the 233-S safety documentation (Remedial Design Report). In the meantime, BHI continues to prepare for an August 1997 readiness assessment and the start of D&D work in the non-process pipe gallery of 233-S. This initial field work will not involve the highly contaminated process hood.

2. N-Basins: In June, DOE-RL and the regulators renegotiated the Tri Party Agreement milestones for N-Basin cleanout. The deactivation completion date was moved from September 1997 to April 1998. At N-Basins, BHI continues to work on low dose debris removal, high exposure rate hardware removal, and relocation of sludge on the basin floor.

3. REDOX: BHI's progress in replacing the D-Cell cover blocks in the REDOX canyon continues to be very slow, and now BHI has new evidence that there may be more than just two cover blocks removed from D-Cell. The delays are due, in part, to difficulties in processing USQs for cover block replacement activities while the draft authorization basis document is in the review cycle. No formal authorization basis currently exists.

cc: Board Members