

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 23, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 23, 1998

DNFSB Activity Summary: T. Dwyer was on site all week, except Wednesday, when he attended the SMT Meeting at DOE-AL. H. Waugh was on site Wednesday through Friday. M. Forsbacka was on site Tuesday through Thursday observing the W56 SIID Adequacy Review.

W69 Dismantlement Program: With suitable ceremony, M&H completed the W69 Dismantlement Program on Wednesday. All but 1 remaining unit (the last dismantled unit -- LDU) were completely dismantled by Monday afternoon, and DOE-AL (ONDP, WPD), AAO, and M&H senior management presided at a gathering to honor the PTs and the extended project team. The final unit was saved for "solo" dismantlement on Wednesday -- both bay and cell operations were available for observation by various of the ranking dignitaries.

W56 Dismantlement Program: The W56 Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) Group conducted the Single Integrated Input Document (SIID) Adequacy Review on October 20th-21st. The SIID consists of technical descriptions of the W56 system, its associated dismantlement activities, and hazards descriptions and analyses provided by the Design Agencies and M&H. Based on this SIID, it appears that the SS-21 process has positively impacted the development of documentation related to W56 dismantlement. The Adequacy Review proceeded in a smooth fashion, and the documentation package was deemed to provide satisfactory information to conduct the NESS. The NESS Group also discussed the scope of the upcoming W56 NESS. One decision of note was to exclude from evaluation contingencies for not-likely, but credible, abnormal events. In such an event, any corrective action procedures generated will be required to undergo Nuclear Explosive Safety change control.

Integrated Weapons Activity Plan (IWAP): DOE-AL, under the aegis of the Standing Management Team (SMT), continues its effort to develop an IWAP by December 1st. WPD (Glass) is currently iterating with individual project teams, directing revisions to individual IWAP project plans. Certain common direction has been provided to all teams: 1] Do not wait for formal ISP to implement enhancements identified in IWAP reviews; 2] Perform a Fire Hazards Analysis; 3] Perform an ESD Analysis; 4] Non-IHE systems require a single workstand; 5] Convert all procedures to SS-21 NEOPs; 6] Develop a HAR; 7] Develop an ABCD; 8] Complete an Authorization Agreement. The key activities from this direction are items 6, 7, and 8. In particular, WPD has ordered that all weapons programs complete these activities this fiscal year. The AAO Senior Scientific and Technical Advisor has been tasked to form a core team that will drive HAR/ABCD development to completion on this schedule, to a level of depth and rigor specified by WPD. In fact, WPD has assigned this aggressive deadline to use schedule pressure to combat any tendency for HAR team over-analysis. The first program to be addressed by the HAR team will be the W62. DOE-AL intends that the IWAP and its concomitant activities be a major part of the DOE Implementation Plan for Board Recommendation 98-2, subrecommendation 1.