

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 31, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending July 31, 1998

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh and T. Dwyer were on site all week. D. Burnfield and J. DeLoach were on site Monday-Wednesday for the ISMS Verification Team Orientation. D. Grover was on site Monday-Wednesday for the Sealed Insert Design Review. W. Andrews was on site Friday attending the W87 LEP Senior Management Group meeting.

ISMS Verification: The ISMS Verification Review Team conducted an orientation this week, with presentations by M&H and AAO. A potentially significant review deficiency appears to exist: DOE-AL has directed the ISMS Team to exclude DOE-AL performance from the scope of its verification effort. Design Agency performance has also been declared to be outside the scope. Since every one of the five ISMS functional areas (define work, analyze hazards, etc.) is heavily dependent upon DOE-AL and Design Agency activities, it is not clear how the ISMS system at Pantex can be adequately evaluated. Another potential flaw in the review hinges upon M&H readiness for the review. The Review Plan identifies 3 pre-requisites, of which 2 have not been provided. Based upon these concerns, plus numerous others discussed with the ISMS Verification Review Team Leader, it is not clear that a successful review can be accomplished.

W62 ASSET-like Review: On Wednesday, M&H initiated then aborted the ASSET-like review of the W62 Dismantlement process. The review will recommence once M&H has identified and tasked an adequate review team (to include senior management, Design Agency, NES, and SS-21 experienced personnel), developed a review plan and schedule, determined the end product(s) that the review team will produce, and identified a recipient for these products.

W79 Cell Dissolution: After 2 false-starts, dissolution of the 3rd W79 Dismantlement Program unit commenced Wednesday swing shift and was successfully completed Thursday. The false-starts involved: [1] One unit was unpackaged and found to be double-bagged and tagged as potentially internally contaminated. This unit was set aside. [2] Another unit's storage can vacuum holding fixture [known to be out of calibration] could not pass the required vacuum check. A NEEP has been written to accommodate this deficiency for this unit and 4 others.

Sealed Insert Design Review: An independent design review chaired by LANL convened this week to evaluate the AL-R8 Sealed Insert (SI) design. Goals of this review were to establish whether the SI can provide the storage environment required by the pit storage specifications and whether procurement may proceed. The review team provided a critical review of the design within the specified review scope, which included only requirements from the pit storage specifications and the SI down-select criteria. The team consensus was that the SI design is not yet ready for a final design review. The documentation required to establish compliance with the storage specifications has either not been developed or remains in draft form. Further, necessary testing has not been performed or incorporated as future actions in the project schedule.