

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 12, 1999

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
K. Fortenberry, Deputy Technical Director

FROM: T. L. Hunt

SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending August 12, 1999

Tim Hunt was on site this week as substitute Site Representative.

Recommendation 94-1. DOE has decided to revise their path forward for disposition of 3000 kg of sand, slag, and cricible previously slated to be shipped to the Savannah River Site for processing. The delay in certifying the 9975 shipping container compelled DOE to reassess the SS&C disposition pathway. Although RFFO would prefer to send the material to SRS (already packaged to SRS requirements, \$10 M to repackage to WIPP standards, ALARA concerns), DOE/HQ has made the decision to send the SS&C to WIPP (WIPP EIS already covers this material, desire to shutdown SRS canyons, expensive to process and store at SRS). Since the material is already packaged for shipment to SRS, it must be repackaged in pipe components to meet WIPP criteria. The majority of the containers (about 70% of the 2000) can be shipped to WIPP without a major repackaging effort (inner Al crimp lid/2 nylon bags/outer crimp lid) by removing double barrier configuration from convenience can and putting into the pipe component, if the issues with the nylon bags and pressure generation are resolved favorably. The NRC must approve a revision to the TRUCON code to allow the use of nylon bags without venting. An estimated 30% of the cans (containing >10% Pu or >200 grams Pu) will require material repackaging in a glovebox to get below WIPP limits prior to packaging in the pipe component. Kaiser-Hill is preparing a report to justify the reclassification of this material from high risk (due to presence of pyrophoric Pu and reactive metals) to low risk so it can be sent to WIPP without further stabilization. A 94-1 IP change for sending the SS&C to WIPP instead of SRS, with new milestones, will also eventually be submitted to the Board. (III-A.1.a)

Building 776 Deactivation. B776/777 Complex is undergoing a Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Independent Validation Review (IVR). It appears that several pre-start findings will preclude the facility from implementing the BIO and TSRs as soon as hoped (8/25/99). The major concern has been the deficient level of knowledge of the BIO/TSR conditions and requirements exhibited by many, most notably 2 of the 3 Shift Managers (SM). Following poor performances by the SMs during the crosstable and interviews, DOE questioned whether the facility was able to safely operate under the *existing* authorization basis (FSAR and OSRs). DOE took the unusual step of requesting that K-H immediately justify continued safe operations in B776 by assessing the SMs during performance of their routine duties, probing the SMs level of knowledge of the FSAR/OSRs, and providing historical proof (e.g., K-H assessments, Facility Rep assessments, Internal Management assessment, ORPS) to DOE that the facility has functioned safely in the recent past. Rather than go through an oral reevaluation, one of the SMs disqualified himself from his duties. The facility also initiated a 3-hour standdown for additional training to the BIO of the other SMs. (III-B.1.a)

cc: Board Members