

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 17, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 17, 1999

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh was on site Monday through Wednesday, and Friday. T. Dwyer was on site all week.

W62 D&I Program: Preparations for W62 D&I Program start-up continued this week:

- ! By Thursday morning, M&H stood ready to demonstrate closure of approximately 10 of the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS)/Readiness Assessment (RA) findings, once DOE-AL and AAO worked out the protocol for observation and verification. In fact, AAO had taken the lead in negotiating with ISRD (C. Longenbaugh) and WPD (K. Boardman) to finalize the path forward to close the findings. Updates to the NEOPs were reportedly complete, and Level II training of the PTs had commenced the day before. By Thursday afternoon, training had been secured and the trainers were being restored to their full-up condition. The reason -- AAO was unable to determine from the M&H/DOE-AL RA reports which portions of the D&I process would specifically require redemonstration. M&H was therefore directed to prepare to conduct a redemonstration of the entire process (end-to-end) commencing Friday, before AAO Facility Representatives, AAO Production Operations staff, and selected DOE-AL personnel [e.g., RA team lead].
- ! The W62 NESS report has been presented to the DOE-AL manager. Based on his feedback, 2 of the NESS findings originally categorized as post-start issues are being upgraded to pre-start status: 1] inclusion of the W62 Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules (NESRs) in the ABCD; and 2] modification of the Safety Evaluation Screen process for NEOPs to require evaluations to be made beyond the current "go-no go" check for a link to the ABCD.
- ! The DOE-AL RA final report was issued on Tuesday. The final tally was 5 pre-start and 9 post-start findings. [The finding concerning a specific HE response scenario that had been pending the results of the NESS Revalidation was deemed a post-start issue.] The report is incomplete in that it only characterizes the observed deficiencies [i.e., presents data equivalent to Form 2's]. Appraisal Forms [Form 1's] describing all CRADs reviewed are not provided, so it is difficult to determine the completeness and adequacy of the RA. Also, the RA team observed deficiencies with regard to premature declarations of readiness, but did not include them in the report. Of note, the DOE-AL letter forwarding this report paints a surprisingly positive picture of the results and effectiveness of the review.^[III.A]

Lightning Issues: Revision 4 to the Lightning JCO (PX-JCO-99-002, *Evaluation of Lightning Hazards and Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) of Nuclear Explosive Operations*) was issued today. In addition, DOE-AL has signed out a letter to SNL prioritizing required support in this area as follows: 1] analyze all warhead shipping containers; 2] analyze all bomb storage configurations; 3] analyze the Zone 4 SAC magazines; 4] provide roof slot bonding criteria; 5] analyze all intra-zone transport containers; 6] test remaining untested facility types; 7] analyze vacuum chambers; and 8] test Building 12-104A bays 17 and 24.^[III.A]